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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 We are called upon in this case principally to perform 
one of our most delicate duties -- determining whether Congress 
exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting a federal law. 
At issue is the power of Congress to criminalize "carjacking" --
the armed theft of an automobile from the presence of another by 
force and violence or by intimidation.  Congress believed that it 
had the power to criminalize the carjacking of any motor vehicle 
that has been transported, shipped or received in interstate or 
foreign commerce, and accordingly enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2119 to do 
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just that.  Edward Stokes and Kevin Bishop were convicted under 
that statute of carjacking an automobile in East Orange, New 
Jersey.  They appeal their convictions on numerous grounds, most 
of which require little discussion.  However, we address in 
greater depth two of the arguments:  (1) that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited the district court from 
imposing consecutive sentences for carjacking in violation of 
28 U.S.C. § 2119 and use of a firearm during the commission of a 
violent felony in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 924(c); and (2) that 
Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting the 
carjacking statute.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Close to midnight on the warm, pleasant night of 
July 22, 1994, after getting a bite to eat, Roger Bradley decided 
to teach his fiancee, Grace Rollins, how to drive the new Dodge 
Shadow automobile Bradley had purchased just three weeks 
previously.  Bradley chose the parking lot of a Channel store in 
East Orange, New Jersey for the lesson and pulled his car into 
the lot.  Rollins practiced driving in the parking lot for a 
while, then decided that she had had enough, and the two got out 
of the car to switch positions. 
 As they did so, they were approached by two men.  One 
of the men put a pistol to Bradley's head and demanded the car 
keys; the other put a hand over Rollins' mouth and held her from 
behind.  After Bradley turned over the keys, the two men drove 
off, but not before both Bradley and Rollins got a good look at 
the man who had brandished the gun at Bradley. 
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 Luckily, as the thieves pulled away in the car and 
Bradley ran out into the road, he spotted a police car that had 
just pulled into another nearby parking lot.  Flagging down the 
police, Bradley described the incident and his automobile, and 
provided descriptions of the assailants.  This information was 
broadcast over the police radio. 
 Officer Morris Rhodes of the East Orange Police 
Department heard the bulletin, and shortly thereafter an 
automobile matching the description drove by him.  Its occupants 
fit the general description (two black males) Bradley had 
provided.  Officer Rhodes followed without his lights on while 
radioing in the license plate number, then switched on the lights 
and siren when the report came back that the car was the vehicle 
in question. 
 The Shadow accelerated and tried to pass another car 
that was turning, but struck the other car and careened into a 
building.  As Officer Rhodes pulled up to the scene, he saw a man 
exit through the driver's side window, fall to the pavement, get 
up, and run.  Officer Rhodes gave chase, pulled his gun, and 
ordered the man to stop.  The man stopped and was arrested and 
handcuffed.  That man was Edward Stokes.  Two guns were found on 
the floor of the automobile, but the other man who had been in 
the car was not found. 
 Officer Rhodes took Stokes to the police station and 
booked him, videotaping the procedure.  At one point during the 
booking, one of the officers asked Stokes, who had been limping, 
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what was the matter with his leg.  Stokes responded that he had 
hurt it in an accident. 
 Within an hour and a half of the carjacking, Bradley 
and Rollins were taken into a room at the police station, one at 
a time, to view a suspect.  Prior to viewing the suspect, they 
had heard the police talking about having apprehended the man who 
had stolen the car.  Through a one-way mirror, they both 
identified Stokes as the man who had held a gun to Bradley's 
head. 
 Kevin Bishop was arrested three months later on 
unrelated charges.  Both he and Stokes were later indicted for 
carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, use of a firearm 
during commission of a violent felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c), and being felons in possession of a firearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
 After the district court denied Bishop's motion to 
dismiss, which had alleged that the carjacking statute was 
unconstitutional, Bishop pleaded guilty to the charges against 
him on February 4, 1994.  He received a sentence of 210 months of 
imprisonment, three years of supervised release and a $2,000 
fine. 
 Stokes' case went to trial.  Prior to that trial, the 
district court denied Stokes' motion to suppress evidence of the 
victims' out-of-court identification of him and to bar the 
government from using the victims to identify Stokes in court. At 
trial, the victims testified about their out-of-court 
identifications of Stokes and identified him as the perpetrator 
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again before the jury.  Also, over Stokes' objection, the 
district court permitted the government to introduce into 
evidence Stokes' comment during booking about injuring his leg 
and to show the jury the videotape of Stokes' booking.  The jury 
found Stokes guilty of carjacking and use of a firearm during the 
commission of a violent felony and (subsequently, in the second 
half of the bifurcated trial) of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm.  Stokes was sentenced to 248 months of imprisonment, 
three years of supervised release and a $5,000 fine. 
 Both Bishop and Stokes appealed,0 and we consolidated 
their appeals for purposes of argument and disposition.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 As we stated at the outset, although both Bishop and 
Stokes have raised numerous issues, we address in the body of 
this opinion only two issues:  Stokes' argument that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits consecutive 
sentences for carjacking (18 U.S.C. § 2119) and use of a firearm 
during the commission of a violent felony (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); 
and Bishop's and Stokes' arguments that the carjacking statute is 
unconstitutional because in enacting the statute, Congress 
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause.0 
                     
0
 Although Bishop pleaded guilty without reserving his right 
to appeal his motion to dismiss the indictment because of the 
alleged constitutional invalidity of section 2119, see Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(a)(2), we have jurisdiction over his appeal of this 
issue because it goes to the jurisdiction of the district court. 
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 63 n.1 (1975); Blackledge v. 
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974). 
0
 We have considered and reject Bishop's argument that the 
carjacking statute violates equal protection.  See United States 
v. Watson, 815 F.Supp. 827, 832-36 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
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II. 
                                                                  
 
 Additionally, we reject Stokes' other arguments on appeal, 
namely:  that the station house "show-up" of Stokes was so unduly 
suggestive that the district court abused its discretion in 
failing to exclude the evidence of the victims' out-of-court 
identification of him and in refusing to bar their in-court 
identifications; that the district court abused its discretion in 
permitting the videotape of the booking procedure to be shown 
during trial; and that the district court erred in failing to 
suppress Stokes' comment about his leg injury during the booking 
procedure.  None of these issues has merit. 
 
 Although the show-up was arguably unnecessarily and 
impermissibly suggestive, the district court did not commit clear 
error in finding as matters of fact that the victims' 
identifications were the result of their own recollections of the 
crime and not the result of what may well have been an 
impermissibly suggestive show-up.  Nor did the district court err 
in concluding that the identifications were reliable.  Thus, the 
identifications were admissible.  See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 
188 (1972). 
 
 Concerning admission of the videotape of the booking at 
trial, Stokes provides no good reason why the videotape of the 
booking should not have been shown to the jury, and the 
government provided a number of good reasons why it was properly 
introduced.  Thus, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in siding with the government. 
 
 Finally, with respect to the court's admission at trial of 
Stokes' non-Mirandized statement, we join the other courts of 
appeals that have addressed the issue and recognize that there is 
a "routine booking exception" to the requirements of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  See United States v. Horton, 873 
F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (8th Cir. 1989) (listing cases from First, 
Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits recognizing 
"routine booking exception").  Applying that exception in this 
case, the district court did not commit clear error in finding 
that the police officer's question about Stokes' limp was part of 
the booking procedure designed to fulfill the government's 
obligation to provide medical attention if necessary.  Thus, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the 
statement to be introduced as evidence under the "routine booking 
questions" exception to Miranda. 
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 Stokes argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment0 prohibited the district court from imposing 
consecutive sentences upon him for carjacking in violation of 28 
U.S.C. § 21190 and use of a firearm during the commission of a 
violent felony in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 924(c).0  Our standard 
                     
0
 That Clause states, "[N]or shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb 
. . . ."  U.S. Const., Amend. V. 
0
 At the time of the commission of the carjacking at issue 
here, Section 2119 provided that: 
 
 Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined 
in section 921 of this title, takes a motor 
vehicle that has been transported, shipped, 
or received in interstate or foreign commerce 
from the person or presence of another by 
force and violence or by intimidation, or 
attempts to do so, shall-- 
 
  (1) be fined under this title 
or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or 
both, 
 
  (2) if serious bodily injury 
(as defined in section 1365 of this 
title) results, be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 25 
years, or both, and 
 
  (3) if death results, be fined 
under this title or imprisoned for any 
number of years up to life, or both.   
 
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993).  The Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, enacted September 13, 1994, amended 
subsection (3) of this statute by adding a death penalty 
provision and the phrase "with the intent to cause death or 
serious bodily harm" in place of the phrase "possessing a firearm 
as defined in section 921 of this title."  Pub. L. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796, 1970, Section 60003(a)(14) (1994).  We do not address 
the implications, if any, of this change upon the Double Jeopardy 
analysis in the text, and we view this change as having no impact 
upon our Commerce Clause discussion. 
0
 Section 924(c) provides in pertinent part: 
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of review is plenary.  United States v.  Lattany, 982 F.2d 866 
(3rd Cir. 1992). 
 Stokes relies on the principle that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. 
However, as the Supreme Court has found, "With respect to 
cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court 
from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature 
intended."  Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). 
 Attempting to fit within this rubric, Stokes argues 
that we should apply the rule of statutory construction announced 
in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).  The 
essential question of that test is "whether each provision 
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 
Id. at 304.  In this case, Stokes argues, since all violations of 
the carjacking statute necessarily constitute violations of 
§ 924(c), the statutes fail the Blockburger test and their 
consecutive application would violate double jeopardy "in the 
absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent." 
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980). 
 Although we have not yet addressed the Double Jeopardy 
implications of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2119, Stokes' arguments 
have been raised in every other court of appeals except the 
                                                                  
 (1)  Whoever, during and in relation to 
any crime of violence . . . uses or carries a 
firearm shall, in addition to the punishment 
provided for such crime . . . be sentenced to 
imprisonment for five years. . . . 
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Seventh and D.C. Circuits.  Defendants have lost every time. 
United States v. Centeno-Torres, 50 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Mohammed, 27 F.3d 815, 819-20 (2d Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Johnson, 32 F.3d 82, 85 (4th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419, 1425-29 (5th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 107-08 (6th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Jones, 34 F.3d 596 (8th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Moore, 43 F.3d 568 (11th Cir. 1994).  Indeed, when one evaluates 
the statutes at issue, it is evident why no appellate court has 
accepted Stokes' Double Jeopardy theory, for although Stokes 
wants us to apply Blockburger, to do so would be to put the cart 
before the horse.  Blockburger applies when the legislative 
intent is not clear.  Here, the statutes are clear.  As the 
Second Circuit noted in Mohammed, "Because the legislative intent 
to impose a consecutive sentence for the violation of section 
924(c) is plain from the language of that provision, . . . we 
need not consider the Blockburger test to conclude that the 
consecutive sentence imposed in this case did not violate double 
jeopardy."  Mohammed, 27 F.3d at 819.  This conclusion required 
the Mohammed court to move no mountains:  as even a cursory 
reading of section 924(c) (supra n.5) confirms, that statute says 
that its punishment applies "in addition to the punishment 
provided for" the crime in which the firearm was used.  Because 
Congress unambiguously provided that it wanted to impose a 
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consecutive sentence, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not 
triggered. 
 Even if we were to apply the Blockburger test to 
sections 924(c) and 2119, we would find no Double Jeopardy 
problem.  In this regard, we are persuaded by the reasoning of 
Judge Wisdom in United States v. Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419 (5th 
Cir. 1994).0  As Judge Wisdom explained, the clear indication in 
section 924(c) that its penalty was to apply "in addition to the 
punishment provided" for the underlying crime in which the 
firearm is used or carried "states that Congress intended for 
§ 924(c)'s five-year sentence to be imposed cumulatively with the 
punishment for the predicate drug-related or violent crime." 
Singleton, 16 F.3d at 1425.  This Congressional intent, Judge 
Wisdom explained, eliminated any Blockburger problem. 
 Both of the objections raised by Stokes to this 
conclusion were addressed and rejected in Singleton.  First, 
Stokes argues that the legislative history of the 1984 amendments 
to section 924(c) demonstrate that Congressional concern was 
focused on responding to the Supreme Court's decision in United 
States v. Simpson, 435 U.S. 6 (1978), in which the Court had 
ruled that Congress had not intended former section 924(c) to be 
applied in conjunction with statutes that included their own 
                     
0
 Judge Wisdom believed that the statutes failed the 
Blockburger test, in that proof of a violation of section 2119 
necessarily proves a violation of section 924(c).  While we agree 
with the Second Circuit that the Blockburger test need not be 
applied to these statutes, we agree with Judge Wisdom that, if 
applied, Blockburger does not demonstrate a constitutional 
violation. 
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penalty enhancement provisions for the use of a firearm. 
According to Stokes, Congress intended its 1984 amendments to 
section 924(c) to clarify that 924(c) applied in such situations: 
 Section 924(c) sets out an offense 
distinct from the underlying felony and is 
not simply a penalty provision . . . . 
 
 [T]he Supreme Court's decisions in 
Simpson v. United States, and Busic v. United 
States, have negated the section's use in 
cases involving statutes . . . which have 
their own enhanced, but not mandatory, 
punishment provisions in situations where the 
offense is committed with a dangerous weapon. 
These are precisely the type of extremely 
dangerous offenses for which a mandatory 
punishment for the use of a firearm is the 
most appropriate. 
 
S. Rep. No. 225 at 312, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3490 (footnotes 
omitted).  According to Stokes, "[b]y 1992, the date of the 
enactment of § 2119, the sentencing guidelines were in effect, 
and minimum sentences based on the guideline calculations would 
be applied to all § 2119 violators.  Therefore, the stated intent 
of the 1984 Congress in passing § 924(c) to assure mandatory jail 
time for gun-toting offenders does not dictate consecutive 
sentences for a statute adopted after the Guidelines were already 
in effect."  Stokes Br. 23.  Without reproducing Judge Wisdom's 
analysis of amended section 924(c) and its legislative history 
here, however, we agree with his conclusion that the text and 
legislative history "make it clear that Congress wanted to stack 
§ 924(c)'s punishment atop all predicate crimes that came within 
the statute, not just the Simpson/Busic variety of predicate 
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crimes for which the statutes included `enhancement' provisions." 
Singleton, 16 F.3d at 1427. 
 Second, Stokes attempts to escape the plain language of 
section 924(c) by arguing that, since 924(c) was enacted before 
section 2119, there is no clear legislative intent that the 
phrase "any crime of violence" in 924(c) meant "any crime of 
violence, including those enacted hereafter."  Thus, according to 
Stokes, the legislative intent is not clear and the statutes 
cannot be applied in tandem.  Again, we agree with Judge Wisdom 
that the sequence of enactment of the statutes is irrelevant. 
Once Congress has clearly stated an intention to stack 
punishments as it did in section 924(c), "it need not reiterate 
that intent in any subsequent statutes that fall within the 
previously defined class."  Singleton, 16 F.3d at 1428. 
Otherwise, Congress would have to "repeat itself, restating in 
each subsequent enactment an intention Congress thought it 
clearly expressed once already.  We see no reason to require such 
a convoluted approach to lawmaking."  Id.  Section 924(c) is 
clear, and applying multiple punishments under that provision and 
section 2119 does not violate Double Jeopardy. 
III. 
 We turn, therefore, to Bishop's and Stokes' argument 
that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority under the 
Commerce Clause when it enacted section 2119.  Under the Commerce 
Clause, of course, Congress is empowered "to regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes."  U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  This power has 
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been construed broadly to permit regulation of a great deal of 
modern life.0  Thus, until recently, appellants' argument that 
Congress could not regulate the species of motor vehicle theft 
known as carjacking was uniformly rejected by the courts of 
appeals that had considered the issue.0 
 However, Bishop and Stokes believe that new life was 
breathed into their challenge on April 26, 1995.  On that date, 
for the first time in more than half a century, the Supreme Court 
in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), invalidated a 
Congressional enactment solely because Congress had exceeded its 
authority under the Commerce Clause.0  Because we will address 
                     
0
 Supreme Court precedents demonstrate the breadth of 
Congressional Commerce Clause power, which has been found to 
include the ability to regulate, for example, the company one 
keeps in a local barbecue restaurant or city hotel, Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. 
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); the ability of a farmer to 
grow his or her own crops for personal consumption as he or she 
sees fit, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); the ability of 
a loanshark to make extortionate extensions of credit, even 
though the particular transaction has no nexus with interstate 
commerce, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); and the 
ability of a landlord-turned-arsonist to put the match to his own 
rental property, whether or not he rented in interstate commerce, 
Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985). 
0
 United States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Bell, 46 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Harris, 25 F.3d 1275 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson, 
22 F.3d 106 (6th Cir. 1994). 
0
 In National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), 
the Court invalidated an extension of federal wage law to state 
operations because Congress' exertion of its Commerce Clause ran 
afoul of states' reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment. 
National League of Cities was subsequently overruled.  Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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Lopez throughout the balance of this opinion, it is useful to 
provide an overview of the decision here. 
 At issue in Lopez was the constitutionality of the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), 
which made it a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to 
possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has 
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."  As one may 
observe from the language of the statute, nothing connected this 
statute overtly with commerce among the states or even any 
economic transaction.  To the contrary, it penalized the simple 
possession of any handgun within a "school zone," which was 
defined later in the statute (with certain exceptions) as the 
grounds of a public, private or parochial school or within 1000 
feet of the grounds.  Alfonzo Lopez was convicted of violating 
the Act by bringing a .38 caliber handgun to school, but on 
appeal he persuaded the Fifth Circuit that the law was 
unconstitutional because it lacked the requisite nexus with 
interstate commerce. 
 The Supreme Court affirmed.  The Court noted that 
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause may involve three 
categories of regulation:  (1) Congress may regulate "the use of 
channels of interstate commerce"; (2) Congress may "regulate and 
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons 
or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come 
only from intrastate activities"; and (3) Congress may "regulate 
those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
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commerce, . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. 
 The government in Lopez tried to justify § 922(q) 
solely on the ground that it fit within Category Three, as "a 
regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce."  Lopez, id.  The Court noted, however, that § 922(q) 
by its terms was a criminal statute that "has nothing to do with 
`commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly 
one might define those terms."  Id.  Furthermore, the Court noted 
that the statute "contains no jurisdictional element which would 
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession 
in question affects interstate commerce."  Id. at 1631.  And the 
Court noted that the government had conceded that neither the 
statute nor its legislative history contained any findings 
concerning the effects upon interstate commerce of possession of 
a gun in a school zone.  Id. 
 The government's Category Three justifications were 
twofold.  First, the government argued that possession of a gun 
in a school zone may result in an increase in violent crime, 
which in turn increases societal costs through increased 
insurance costs and also decreases travel to unsafe areas.  Id. 
at 1632.  Second, the government argued that guns in schools 
threaten the learning environment, which in turn creates a less 
productive citizenry and adversely affects the national economy. 
Id.  The Court rejected these arguments as potentially limitless 
justifications for virtually any conceivable Congressional 
legislation.  Id.  Anything that might lead to violent crime 
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could be regulated under the government's "cost of crime" 
argument, the Court noted, as well as anything that was related 
to the productivity of individual citizens, including such 
traditional areas of state law as family law.  Id.  Seeing no 
other justification for the law, the Court found it 
unconstitutional. 
 The district court in this case found that section 2119 
was constitutional, but did so without the benefit of Lopez.  The 
parties initially briefed the Commerce Clause issue before us 
without the benefit of Lopez as well, leading us to hold the case 
pending the Court's decision in Lopez and then to request 
supplemental briefing. 
 Exercising plenary review of the district court's legal 
determination that section 2119 is constitutional, we will 
affirm. 
A. 
 The government's primary argument fits within the third 
category of problems which Congress may permissibly regulate 
under its Commerce Clause power:  Congress may "regulate those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, 
. . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.  According to the 
government, section 2119 is justified under Category Three for 
two reasons:  (1) Congress had a rational basis for believing 
that carjacking substantially affects interstate commerce; and 
(2) section 2119 has, as an element of the offense, a requirement 
19 
that there be a constitutionally adequate nexus with interstate 
commerce.  We agree with both arguments. 
1. 
(a) 
 Although ultimately the federal courts are the arbiters 
of constitutional questions, "the Commerce Clause grants Congress 
extensive power and ample discretion to determine its appropriate 
exercise."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
We therefore must give substantial deference to a Congressional 
determination that it had the power to enact particular 
legislation.  As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence in 
Lopez, 
[t]he history of the judicial struggle to 
interpret the Commerce Clause during the 
transition from the economic system the 
Founders knew to the single, national market 
still emergent in our own era counsels great 
restraint before the Court determines that 
the Clause is insufficient support to an 
exercise of the national power. 
Id.  And again, "Whatever the judicial role, it is axiomatic that 
Congress does have substantial discretion and control over the 
federal balance" between the national government and the states. 
Id. at 1639.  Deference to Congressional judgments about the 
contours of Commerce Clause power stems in part, as Justice 
Kennedy explained, from the fact that Congress is a coordinate 
branch of the federal government charged with the government's 
legislative authority.  Id. at 1634. 
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 Indeed, the primary check upon Congressional action is 
its direct responsibility to the will of the people.  This has 
sometimes been stated categorically: 
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, 
their identity with the people, and the 
influence which their constituents possess at 
elections are, in this, as in many other 
instances . . . the sole restraints on which 
they have relied, to secure them from its 
abuse.  They are the restraints on which the 
people must often rely solely, in all 
representative governments. 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 197 (1824) (Marshall, 
CJ.).  Notwithstanding the ultimate check of the ballot box, 
however, it is beyond peradventure (and was recently and 
forcefully demonstrated in Lopez itself) that the federal courts 
also must play a role in regulating the exercise of Congressional 
power: 
When the conduct of an enterprise affects 
commerce among the States is a matter of 
practical judgment, not to be determined by 
abstract notions.  The exercise of this 
practical judgment the Constitution entrusts 
primarily and very largely to Congress, 
subject to the latter's control by the 
electorate.  Great power was thus given to 
the Congress:  the power of legislation and 
thereby the power of passing judgment upon 
the needs of a complex society.  Strictly 
confined though far reaching power was given 
to this Court:  that of determining whether 
the Congress has exceeded limits allowable in 
reason for the judgment which it has 
exercised. 
Polish National Alliance v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 
U.S. 643, 650 (1944) (emphasis added).  Because the legislature 
has no "structural mechanisms to require those officials to 
undertake [the] principled task [of safeguarding federalism], and 
21 
[because of] the momentary political convenience often attendant 
upon their failure to do so," it is incumbent upon the courts to 
ensure that Congress does not overstep constitutional boundaries. 
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  "[T]he 
federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional 
structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us 
to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of 
Government has tipped the scales too far."  Id. 
 The Supreme Court's jurisprudence makes it abundantly 
clear that our job in this case is not to second-guess the 
legislative judgment of Congress that carjacking substantially 
affects interstate commerce, but rather to ensure that Congress 
had a rational basis for that conclusion.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explained in Lopez, 
In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court warned 
that the scope of the interstate commerce 
power "must be considered in the light of our 
dual system of government and may not be 
extended so as to embrace effects upon 
interstate commerce so indirect and remote 
that to embrace them, in view of our complex 
society, would effectively obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what 
is local and create a completely centralized 
government."  [NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)] . . . .  Since 
that time, the Court has heeded that warning 
and undertaken to decide whether a rational 
basis existed for concluding that a regulated 
activity sufficiently affected interstate 
commerce. 
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (emphasis added).  See also, e.g., id. 
at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("the specific question before 
us, as the Court recognizes, is not whether the `regulated 
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activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce,' but, rather, 
whether Congress could have had a `rational basis' for so 
concluding").  "[T]he proper test requires an analysis of whether 
the regulated activity `substantially affects' interstate 
commerce."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.  We therefore turn to that 
inquiry. 
(b) 
 The carjacking statute at issue in this case began as 
the first section (section 101) of what became the Anti Car Theft 
Act of 1992, Public Law No. 102-519.  In December 1991 and March 
1992, Representative Charles E. Schumer held hearings on H.R. 
4542, a multi-faceted piece of legislation addressing many 
aspects of auto theft.  As he explained, the purpose of the 
hearings was to "examine the scope of the auto crime problem, the 
different sectors of the auto theft industry and why it's so hard 
to catch and convict auto thieves."  Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992: 
Hearings on H.R. 4542 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal 
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st and 
2d Sess. 3 (1991 and 1992) ("Anti-Car Theft Hearings") (statement 
of Rep. Schumer). 
 At those hearings, numerous persons testified about the 
scope and growth of the problem of auto theft in the United 
States.  More pertinent to our inquiry, testimony at those 
hearings also provided evidence that carjacking was emerging as a 
new and growing aspect of the auto theft problem.  See Id. 31-32 
(testimony of Ron Thrash) (carjacking not a serious problem in 
New York City in terms of numbers, but "in other portions of the 
23 
country . . . they're having an increase in that particular type 
of crime"); 69 (testimony of Richard Jeffares) ("We do see an 
increase in carjacking . . . but we do not have statistics 
available on this"); 228 (prepared statement of Herman Brandau) 
(noting that organizations formed utilizing federal grants under 
the proposed Act "can help direct resources to the problems in 
particular areas which need the most attention.  Most frightening 
is the emerging problem of carjacking").  Additionally, materials 
submitted for the hearings provided evidence that thieves who 
begin their auto theft careers as joy riders tend to become 
professionals.  Id. at 268 (letter from William J. Lundy to Lyle 
Nirenberg of 3/23/92) (study "indicated that the people who get 
involved in [auto] theft for profit started out as joy riders who 
found that it could be turned into a profitable business"); see 
also id. at 306-310 (discussion in study).0 
 The House Report accompanying H.R. 4542 consisted of 
three parts:  House Report (Judiciary Committee) No. 102-851(I) 
(August 12, 1992), House Report (Energy and Commerce Committee) 
No. 102-851(II) (Sept. 22, 1992), and House Report (Ways and 
Means Committee) No. 102-851(III) (Sept. 23, 1992), all reprinted 
                     
0
 Additional hearings were held in September 1992 before the 
House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and 
Competitiveness of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee. 
See Anti-Car Theft and Content Labeling:  Hearing on H.R. 4220, 
H.R. 4228, H.R. 4230 and H.R. 4542 Before the Subcomm. on 
Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).  These 
hearings focused on efforts to label automobile parts, to make it 
more difficult to trade in the auto theft "after market" for 
stolen parts. 
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in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829.0  Those reports included the following 
significant findings: 
> "Automobile theft has become the nation's number one 
property crime problem.  More than 1.6 million motor 
vehicles were reported stolen in 1991, an increase of 
34% since 1986.  The stolen automobiles were worth an 
estimated $8-9 billion, representing over 50% of the 
value of property lost to crime."  House Report No. 
102-851(I) at 14. 
 
> "Auto theft has become a very large and lucrative 
business.  The typical auto thief is no longer a 
teenager seeking a joyride.  Now, auto theft is an 
industry peopled by professional criminals operating as 
part of profit-making enterprises."  Id. 
 
> Auto thieves "turn stolen cars into money in three 
ways":  (1) bringing stolen vehicles to "chop shops," 
where they are taken apart and sold for parts; 
(2) "washing" the titles by obtaining an apparently 
valid title for stolen automobiles; and (3) exporting 
the vehicles for sale abroad.  "Enterprises using all 
three profiteering methods regularly engage in 
interstate, even international, trafficking of 
automobiles and auto parts.  Just as important, auto 
thieves have a severe and deleterious effect on 
interstate commerce by imposing significant costs on 
automobile consumers."  Id. at 14-15. 
 
> "In addition to economic costs, car owners are 
increasingly subject to violent crime.  The most recent 
development in auto theft is `armed carjacking.'  In 
these incidents, two or three criminals approach a car 
waiting at a traffic light, or stopped by means of a 
deliberate `fender-bender' accident, and force the 
driver to turn over the keys at gunpoint."  Id. at 15. 
 
> "Auto crime enforcement has been conducted primarily at 
the state and local level.  There are significant 
barriers to enforcement, however, that have resulted in 
49 out of 50 auto thieves escaping punishment.  Cars 
are stolen so easily and dismantled so rapidly that 
police intervention at the point of theft is rare. 
Also, overburdened state and local law enforcement 
agencies are often unable to give auto theft the 
attention it deserves.  Even when criminals are caught 
                     
0
 There was no Senate report. 
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with a stolen car, it can be difficult to make a case 
in court for auto theft because the defendant can claim 
that he purchased the car without knowing that it had 
been stolen."  Id. at 15. 
 
> "[T]heft of motor vehicles is a national problem.  It 
is, however, a complex problem that . . . is broader 
than carjacking and chop shop related thefts."  House 
Report No. 102-851(II) at 12. 
 
> The legislation is not aimed at joyriding.  Id. at 13. 
 
> "Perhaps relating to the opportunity for profit, 
criminals are increasingly committing violent crime in 
the form of `armed carjacking.'"  House Report 
No. 102-851(III) at 2. 
 H.R. 4542 was taken up for vote by both houses of 
Congress in October 1992.  Certainly, during the floor debate on 
the Act, legislators in both the House and Senate expressed 
outrage at the violent aspects of carjacking,0 but statements 
also show that Congress believed carjacking to be a profit-making 
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 E.g., 138 Cong. Rec. H11,819 (statement of Rep. Ramstad) 
("People are outraged and terrified by the heinous carjacking 
epidemic currently upon us.  How can any civilized nation 
tolerate the brutal killing of a mother dragged 2 miles to her 
death, while desperately trying to reach for her infant child 
inside her commandeered car?  How can any civilized people 
tolerate such despicable, outrageous criminal acts?  They cannot 
and they will not"); id. at H11,820 (statement of Rep. Collins) 
("The most shocking case [of carjacking] involved a young mother, 
who was dragged 2 miles to her death during a carjacking in 
Savage, MD, and whose baby was literally thrown from the car. 
This has absolutely galvanized public opinion and outcry that 
this Congress act now to address this awesome despicable crime"); 
id. at H11,821 (statement of Rep. Fazio) ("I doubt there are very 
many people in this area who have not heard about the young 
mother dragged to her death by carjackers.  This senseless 
tragedy is but one of the many which has been occurring with 
increasing regularity across the country"); 138 Cong. Rec. 
S17,960 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) 
("There are many dimensions to the vehicle theft problem, Mr. 
President.  Perhaps the most disturbing is the emerging problem 
of violent carjacking"). 
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crime,0 and one which was a growing part of the interstate and 
international auto theft problem.0 
 Congress apparently concluded that the national and 
international problem of auto theft required a comprehensive 
approach to law enforcement.  Thus, each provision of the Anti 
Car Theft Act of 1992 was designed to address one or more 
elements of the interstate business of automobile theft.  The Act 
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 E.g., 138 Cong. Rec. H11,821 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) 
(statement of Rep. Hoyer) ("Carjacking is not just an impulsive, 
joyriding crime, but is oftentimes motivated by profit"); id. 
(statement of Rep. Fazio) ("Auto theft is no longer confined to 
youngsters out looking for a vehicle for joyriding.  It has 
evolved into carjacking -- a version of auto theft that involves 
armed robbery of a vehicle while the driver is present -- an 
extremely lucrative business in this country.  Carjacking has 
become a high-growth industry that includes both professional 
thieves and parts shops that deal in stolen auto parts, 
merchandise which can be worth up to 4 times as much as the car 
itself.  And the crime is becoming more and more linked to 
violence -- to severe beatings, and even murder"); 138 Cong. Rec. 
S17,961 (daily ed. October 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Pressler) 
("Law enforcement officials have theorized vehicle thieves find 
it easier to use force than to deal with anti-theft devices 
installed in newer model cars.  Additionally, carjackers can 
obtain the keys and registration papers for the cars they 
steal"). 
0
 E.g., 138 Cong. Rec. H11,818 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) 
(statement of Rep. Schumer) ("Our constituents are being 
terrorized by an insidious new form of car theft called 
carjacking"); id. at H11,821 (statement of Rep. Lowery) 
(carjacking provision is "a tough response to what has become a 
national problem"); id. at H11,821-22 (statement of Rep. Norton) 
("With good reason, H.R. 4542 makes armed carjacking a Federal 
offense punishable by imprisonment for up to 15 years.  These 
thefts often cross state lines, and, indeed, to do an effective 
job, law enforcement agencies have had to work regionally and 
nationally, rather than just locally"); 138 Cong. Rec. S17,961 
(daily ed. October 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) 
(noting that car theft is especially prevalent in New Jersey, and 
stating that "[c]arjacking threatens to spread rapidly around the 
nation, as criminals engage in copycat crimes.  To prevent such a 
plague, we need to bring Federal resources to bear").  See also 
statement of Rep. Fazio, supra n.13. 
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not only criminalized carjacking (section 101), but also 
increased the fines and prison terms for importation and 
exportation of stolen vehicles (section 102) and interstate 
transportation or possession of such vehicles (section 103), and 
criminalized the operation of chop shops for dismantling stolen 
vehicles (section 105).0  The Act also provided grants for the 
development of local "anti car theft committees" (section 130-
133), mandated the development of a federal/state task force for 
addressing certain issues related to auto theft and fraud 
(section 140), developed a national system for combatting 
automobile title fraud (sections 201-04), expanded the coverage 
of federal law mandating the marking of automobile parts and 
requiring automobile repair shops to use the markings to avoid 
the use of stolen parts (sections 301-06), and mandated stricter 
Custom Service inspections in order to prevent exportation of 
stolen automobiles (section 401). 
 Together, the findings and floor statements -- and the 
structure of the Act itself -- suggest the following.  Congress 
specifically found that auto theft is an interstate problem --
both that it is often an interstate business itself (albeit an 
illegal one) and that it gnawed away at the innards of the 
American economy by imposing other costs on society as well. 
Congress believed that auto theft was a vast, illicit trade 
substantially affecting interstate and foreign commerce.  Auto 
theft cost consumers both through the direct economic losses 
                     
0
 Section 104 provided for civil and criminal forfeiture in 
certain cases involving auto theft. 
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caused by having their property taken from them, and through 
increased insurance costs.  Congress further believed that 
carjacking was not mere joyriding, but a new and violent form of 
the illicit interstate business of auto theft.  Finally, Congress 
believed that the national problem of auto theft required a 
comprehensive, national response addressing the many different 
aspects of the auto theft problem, because prior state efforts 
had failed to combat the problem effectively. 
(c) 
 Bishop, Stokes, and the dissent assail the findings of 
Congress on a number of grounds.  First, they contend the Supreme 
Court in Lopez created a "bright line" rule that unless an 
activity is "commercial" or "economic," it is beyond the power of 
Congress to regulate no matter what its effect upon interstate 
commerce.  Stokes Supp. Reply Br. at 2.  Because carjacking is 
not "commercial" or "economic," appellants contend, it is simply 
beyond the power of Congress to regulate. 
 We cannot accept this argument.  The Court in Lopez 
disapproved of the statute at issue because possession of a 
handgun was neither economic nor "an essential part of a larger 
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme 
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated." 
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.  By contrast, we can easily appreciate 
how Congress could readily (and rationally) have believed that 
carjacking is both economically motivated and part of a greater 
economic activity.  Indeed, the rationale supporting such a 
conclusion, and distinguishing this case from Lopez, is patently 
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obvious.  First, carjacking is economic in a way that possession 
of a handgun in a school zone is not.  When a criminal points a 
gun at a victim and takes his or her car, the criminal has made 
an economic gain and the victim has suffered an undeniable and 
substantial loss.  Replicated 15,000 or 20,000 times per year, 
the economic effects are indeed profound.  See infra n.22.  By 
comparison, no matter how many criminals possess guns in school 
zones, there is no direct economic effect that arises from the 
crimes.0 
 Furthermore, Congress enacted the carjacking provision 
as one aspect of a national solution to a national economic 
problem.  Every automobile theft is, by definition, local in its 
particulars, yet Congress could have rationally believed that it 
had to regulate carjacking -- whether or not it was strictly 
"commercial" or "economic" -- as one aspect of its comprehensive 
response to the national and international business of criminal 
auto theft. 
                     
0
 Relatedly, appellants argue that the Supreme Court in Lopez 
rejected the theory that the "costs of crime" can support a 
finding that an activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  Bishop Supp. Br. 10.  This misreads Lopez, as well. In 
Lopez, the economic impact of mere possession of a handgun in a 
school zone was speculative at best.  One of the government's 
arguments was that gun possession might lead to violent crimes, 
the costs of which would be spread throughout society through 
increased insurance premiums.  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.  By 
contrast, in enacting the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Congress 
did not rest its findings of substantial effect upon interstate 
commerce solely upon increased insurance costs, but also relied 
upon the direct costs to consumers from lost property resulting 
from auto theft.  Thus, the "cost of crime" justification used by 
Congress in this case is much more concrete than the theory 
rejected by the Court in Lopez. 
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 The dissent argues that Congress' Commerce Clause power 
under category three is limited to regulation of "a voluntary 
economic exchange."  Dissent at 4, 32.  The Supreme Court has 
never before used this definition and the dissent does not state 
how or from where it is derived, nor how the definition accounts 
for prior Supreme Court cases which involved no voluntary 
economic exchange.  See, e.g., Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942) (regulating the production and consumption of home-grown 
wheat).  Where the Court has used a potentially ambiguous term, 
as "commercial" arguably is, we prefer to apply the definitions 
used by the court itself.  Thus, we are content to rely on Lopez 
to define commercial as including those activities which form a 
part of an economic enterprise.  Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631. 
 Bishop and Stokes also contend that, whatever Congress 
may have believed about carjacking, it is simply irrational to 
believe that carjackers are professional thieves out for profit. 
Instead, they contend, carjackings are quintessential local 
crimes of violence.  "Common sense suggests that it is highly 
unlikely that sophisticated theft rings would engage in 
carjacking in order to get cars to deliver to chop shops for 
profit when it is so easy to steal cars without having to resort 
to the obvious dangers involved in a crime of violence."  Bishop 
Supp. Br. at 4.  Again, we disagree.  Of course, no one would 
dispute that carjacking is often violent -- and indeed often 
achieves its economic end only because of the violence employed. 
However, appellants' arguments are unpersuasive on at least two 
grounds.  First, it is incumbent upon a party seeking to undercut 
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Congressional fact-finding to offer something more than mere 
"common sense" intuitions about "the way things are."  Yet 
appellants provided no data to the district court suggesting that 
they have a better grasp than Congress about what motivates 
carjackers or how sophisticated auto theft rings operate, and we, 
as an appellate tribunal, are hardly in a position to do so based 
upon our own conjectures.0   
 Second, available information actually undercuts 
appellants' "common sense" assertions.  In a 1992 report on 
carjacking, the Department of Justice noted that one of the 
motives behind carjacking is "to derive a profit from the resale 
of the vehicle or its parts."  Department of Justice, An Analysis 
of Carjacking in the United States (Oct. 14, 1992) at 3.0  Chop 
shops, salvage switching of vehicle identification numbers, 
exportation, and insurance fraud are some of the well defined 
activities that the study identified as for profit activities 
conducted by carjackers.  Id.  According to the report, law 
                     
0
 Nor have appellants provided us with any information 
supporting their intuitions, assuming that it was appropriate for 
them to do so at this late stage. 
0
 While the report notes that economic gain is not the only 
or even the principal motive behind carjacking, the fact that 
additional motives exist is not relevant to our inquiry.  We must 
simply determine whether Congress could have rationally concluded 
that carjacking bears a substantial relationship to interstate 
commerce.  In order to meet this burden, economic gain need not 
be the exclusive motive for all carjackers.  Congress' 
determination that carjacking affects interstate commerce can be 
supported as long as economic gain is a motive. Cf. United States 
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) 
("Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress' 
action, our inquiry is at an end.  It is, of course, 
`constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact 
underlay the legislative decision.') (citation omitted). 
32 
enforcement officials have theorized that modern anti-theft 
devices have made it easier to carjack many vehicles than to 
steal them when they are parked.  Id. at 2 (see also infra n.21). 
In addition, both contemporary news reports and reported case law 
bear witness to the fact that carjackers are often not joy 
riders, but rather criminals out for profit from the sale of a 
stolen automobile or its parts.0  Thus, Congress' conclusions 
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 See Emily Culbertson, Man Pleads Guilty to Carjacking 
Spree, The (Philadelphia) Legal Intelligencer, Jan. 10, 1995, at 
5 (defendant admits that he and friends carjacked automobile, 
stripped it for parts, and then burned the remains); Jane K. 
Martinez, Cars Parked Askew Lead to 4 Arrests, The Tampa Tribune, 
June 24, 1995, at 1 (police say carjacking ring had stolen six 
cars worth more than $100,000 that were "likely headed for a chop 
shop"); Jeannette DeSantis, 2 Arrested in "Chop Shop" Case, Los 
Angeles Times, Feb. 14, 1995, at B1 (police say foiled carjacker 
led them to chop shop); Vicky Ferstel, Ex-High School Athlete 
Pleads Guilty in Carjacking, The (Baton Rouge) Advocate, Dec. 16, 
1994, at 3B (witness at trial testifies that carjackers took 
stolen automobile to mechanic in an attempt to have the 
automobile stripped for parts); Mary Murphy, Police Arrest 4, 
Seize 19 Vehicles in Theft-Ring Bust, The Orlando Sentinel, 
Sept. 30, 1994, at C1 (police found carjacked truck at illegal 
chop shop); S.K. Bardwell, "She Would Have Given Them the Keys in 
a Heartbeat", The Houston Chronicle, May 17, 1994, at A1 (police 
say carjackers usually have accomplices follow them in another 
automobile so that they can strip the stolen vehicle for parts 
and then flee).  see also United States v. Three Male Juveniles, 
49 F.3d 1058, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995) (defendants who carjacked 
automobile in Texas allegedly intended to take the automobile to 
California and "liquidate the vehicle to obtain funds to purchase 
crack cocaine, which they then intended to sell for a profit"). 
Although Three Male Juveniles involved a prosecution under 18 
U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to unlawfully take a motor vehicle while 
possessing a firearm) and 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (unlawfully taking a 
motor vehicle while possessing a firearm), rather than section 
2119, it did involve a carjacking, and it lends further support 
to the conclusion that economic gain, rather than mere violence 
for its own sake, is often at the heart of carjackings. 
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about the nature and effects of carjacking have been borne out by 
time.0 
 Appellants additionally argue that "it appears that 
there has never been any study or determination as to whether the 
purpose of a carjacking is to resell a car illegally or whether 
it is simply a crime of violence.  There is certainly no 
indication in the House Report that carjackers are, generally, 
members of so-called `sophisticated theft rings' who are reaping 
enormous profits from the theft of autos."  Bishop Supp. Br. 4. 
This argument, however, assumes that Congress must meet a strict 
standard of specificity in finding facts and reporting its 
conclusions.  That is not so.  "Congress is not obligated, when 
enacting its statutes, to make a record of the type that an 
administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial 
review."  Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 
2445, 2471 (1994) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).  Congress need not 
even rely solely upon evidence provided in hearings.  See 
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 513 (1922) ("It was for 
Congress to decide, from its general information and from such 
special evidence as was brought before it, the nature of the 
evils actually present or threatening, and to take such steps by 
                     
0
 Of course, the fact that a legislative prediction does not 
come true does not necessarily mean that legislation premised 
upon it was irrational, provided there was evidence supporting 
the prediction.  "Sound policymaking often requires legislators 
to forecast future events and to anticipate the likely impact of 
these events based on deductions and inferences for which 
complete empirical support may be unavailable."  Turner 
Broadcasting System v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2471 (1994) (opinion 
of Kennedy, J.). 
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legislation within its power as it deemed proper to remedy 
them").0  Congress rationally believed that carjacking was a new 
                     
0
 Of course, we do not know all of the information that was 
known to the legislators who passed the Anti Car Theft Act of 
1992.  That is one of the reasons why it would be difficult to 
second-guess Congress if that were our role.  As Justice Souter 
said in assessing the value of findings in Lopez, "In a case 
comparable to this one, we may have to dig hard to make a 
responsible judgment about what Congress could reasonably find, 
because the case may be close, and because judges tend not to be 
familiar with the facts that may or may not make it close." 
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1656 (Souter, J., dissenting).  We know what 
was said at the hearings, and we know what was written in the 
legislative reports.  Yet almost certainly the legislators had 
other data before them that is not part of the evidence in the 
"legislative history" of the Act -- data from their own personal 
experiences, their discussions with constituents, and their own 
reading.  For example, during the period during which H.R. 4542 
was under consideration, newspapers and periodicals, usually 
quoting police or even carjackers, reported that carjackers often 
strip stolen automobiles for their parts (e.g., David 
Kocieniewski, 2 B'klyn Men Are Nabbed in Manhattan Carnaping, 
Newsday, Oct. 13, 1992, at 22); that they often sell stolen 
automobiles to illegal "chop shops" (e.g., To Foil a Thief, The 
Economist, Oct. 17, 1992, at 30; Jennifer Nagorka, Carjack 
Suspects Arrested; Police:  2 May Be Tied to as Many as 20 Cases, 
Dallas Morning News, Oct. 10, 1992, at 33A; Nora Zamichow, 
"Carjackings," Violent Form of Auto Theft, Reported on the Rise, 
Los Angeles Times, Oct. 9, 1992, at A3; James Harney, Greed, 
Drugs Drove Detroit's "King", USA Today, Oct. 7, 1992, at A2; 
Arnold Abrams, Police Unit to Deal With Carjacking; County to Aid 
Great Neck Peninsula, Newsday, June 7, 1992, at 1; Joe Hughes, 
Car Theft Takes New Turn; Number of "Carjackings" Accelerating in 
San Diego, The San Diego Union-Tribune, March 17, 1992, at A1); 
and that carjackings were increasing for a variety of reasons, 
including the fact that modern anti-theft devices make it safer, 
easier and more profitable to carjack than to steal a parked car 
(e.g., Zamichow, supra; Ben Barber, Terror on the Roads, Calgary 
Herald, Oct. 4, 1992, at B2; Gordon Witkin et al., Willing to 
Kill for a Car, U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 21, 1992, at 40, 
42; "I Want Your Car, Just Get Out":  Carjackers Growing Problem, 
Orlando Sentinel Tribune, Sept. 20, 1992, at A12); Abrams, supra; 
Susan Forrest, Car Thieves Find Another Way; County Being Plagued 
by Rash of "Carjackings", Newsday, March 26, 1992, at 35; Hughes, 
supra). 
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but substantial0 and growing aspect of the vast interstate auto 
theft problem.  As we noted earlier (supra pp. 21-24), Congress 
heard evidence that carjacking was a new form of auto theft that 
was spreading throughout the nation.  It also was presented with 
evidence that even thieves who begin as joy riders tend to become 
professionals -- professionals who would feed the illicit auto 
theft aftermarket for stolen vehicles and parts.  Thus, Congress 
may have believed that even if a carjacker's first crime was 
committed for some non-economic motive, he or she would likely 
soon be a part of the national auto theft problem.  In such 
circumstances, Congress need not have refrained from legislating 
until the carjacking problem reached crisis proportions. 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301 (1964).0 
(d) 
                     
0
 News reports at the time of the passage of the Anti Car 
Theft Act of 1992 indicated that there were 15,000 to 20,000 
carjackings per year.  Ben Barber, Terror on the Roads, Calgary 
Herald, Oct. 4, 1992, at B2.  If the average loss for each 
automobile theft in 1992 was $5,000 (see Anti-Car Theft Hearings, 
supra, at 7 (statement of Lee P. Brown); id. at 210 (statement of 
David F. Snyder)), the direct costs of carjacking to victims was 
between $75,000,000 and $100,000,000.  Cf. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 
U.S. 314, 325 (1981) (disapproving district court finding that 
only an insignificant amount of interstate commerce was involved 
in case, and noting that "the 0.04% of corn production" at stake 
"would have had an approximate value of $5.16 million which is 
surely not an insignificant amount of commerce"). 
0
 Neither Bishop nor Stokes appear to contend that, even if 
Congress had a rational basis for deciding that carjacking 
substantially affects interstate commerce, it nevertheless 
enacted a statute that was not a "reasonable and appropriate" 
means of addressing the perceived evil.  See Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. at 258-59.  Inasmuch as this 
argument may have been raised, however, we believe that 
criminalizing carjacking was a wholly reasonable and appropriate 
response to the problem. 
36 
  In addition to their complaints about the 
Congressional findings, Bishop and Stokes also protest that there 
was no showing that they were members of a criminal enterprise or 
sophisticated car theft ring.  Bishop Supp. Br. 5.  This 
argument, too, misconceives Congressional power.  It is within 
Congressional authority to criminalize or regulate activities 
that, although purely local and intrastate themselves, comprise a 
class of activities that, when aggregated, substantially affect 
interstate commerce.  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631; Russell v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 
U.S. 314, 324 (1981); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 
(1975); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971); 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968); Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).  "If interstate commerce 
[ultimately] feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the 
operation which applies the squeeze."  United States v. Women's 
Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949).  Since Congress 
rationally believed that carjacking, as an economic (i.e. profit-
making) activity, substantially affects interstate commerce, we 
do not "have the power to excise, as trivial, individual 
instances falling within [that] rationally defined class of 
activities . . . ."  Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 193. 
(e) 
 Bishop and Stokes finally argue that permitting the 
federal government to criminalize carjacking would be an 
"unwarranted intrusion into the states' primary authority to 
define and enforce criminal law."  Bishop Supp. Br. 7.  Yet 
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again, appellants lean on Lopez, but find no support.  Obviously, 
this statute is a criminal law, and by virtue of that fact it 
intrudes upon states' traditional dominion over the criminal law. 
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3 ("Under our federal system, the 
`States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the 
criminal law'").  Yet not every federal foray into criminal law 
is invalid.  Here, we believe that there is no great upset of the 
careful balance of federalism. 
 Congress recognized that auto theft had traditionally 
been combatted on the state level, but found that auto theft 
(including carjacking) was a national problem with a substantial 
impact upon commerce, and that state efforts to combat auto theft 
had failed to halt the growth of the auto theft industry.  Supra 
pp. 23-26.  In the same Act in which it criminalized carjacking, 
Congress mandated funds to support local anti-car theft efforts 
and created a federal/state task force to address issues involved 
in the problem.  Thus, Congress did not ignore its "sworn 
obligation to preserve and protect the Constitution in 
maintaining the federal balance . . . ."  Lopez, 115 U.S. at 1639 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  Instead, exercising its "substantial 
discretion and control over the federal balance" (id. at 1639), 
Congress determined that the national problem warranted the 
enactment of curative legislation.  We see this not as wrongful 
usurpation, but rather reasoned, responsible legislation. 
 Nor do we believe that finding section 2119 
constitutional sets the stage for future upset of the 
federal/state balance.  Local activities may become the subject 
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of national legislation when they are found to be part of a 
national problem with a substantial impact upon interstate 
commerce.  Congress reasonably found the local activity of 
carjacking to be a part of the national auto theft problem, and 
it criminalized carjacking as one rather minor aspect of a 
comprehensive effort to solve that problem.0  Finding that 
section 2119 passes constitutional muster does not suggest that 
every local criminal activity may be criminalized by Congress, or 
even that every such activity that results in economic gain may 
be criminalized.  It does suggest that if a criminal activity is 
rationally believed to be one of the conduits of a nationwide and 
international pipeline of illegal activity, Congress may 
justifiably step in and regulate that activity although it is 
wholly intrastate.0 
                     
0
 We note in passing that President Bush's statement upon 
signing the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 singled out the carjacking 
provision for particular praise, noting that "[t]his bill makes 
armed carjacking a Federal offense.  The recent wave of these 
carjackings has made the need for action clear."  Statement By 
President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 4542, 28 Weekly Comp. of 
Pres. Doc. 2122 (Nov. 2, 1992).  We would find this of relatively 
minor significance but for the fact that the Supreme Court in 
Lopez specifically noted President Bush's concern upon signing 
the Gun-Free School Zone Act that, "[m]ost egregiously," the 
possession statute "inappropriately overrides legitimate state 
firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law.  The 
policies reflected in these provisions could legitimately be 
adopted by the States, but they should not be imposed upon the 
States by Congress."  See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 n.3, quoting 
Statement of President George Bush on Signing the Crime Control 
Act of 1990, 26 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1944, 1945 (No. 29, 
1990). 
0
 In this way, section 2119 is no less intrusive into areas 
traditionally reserved for state supervision than was the 
loansharking law upheld in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 
(1971) -- a case cited approvingly and relied upon throughout 
Lopez.  See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-31.  In Perez, Congress had 
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2. 
   Unlike the statute in Lopez, section 2119 contains a 
"jurisdictional element" which ostensibly limits its application 
to activities substantially related to interstate commerce. 
Relying upon United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), and 
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977), the government 
contends that because section 2119 requires the government to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the carjacking victim's 
motor vehicle "has been transported, shipped or received in 
interstate or foreign commerce," the requisite interstate nexus 
is shown in every case in which conviction is secured.  This 
jurisdictional element, the government contends, wholly 
distinguishes Lopez and renders section 2119 constitutional.  We 
agree. The mere presence of a jurisdictional element, however, 
does not in and of itself insulate a statute from judicial 
scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, or render it per se 
constitutional.  To the contrary, courts must inquire further to 
determine whether the jurisdictional element has the requisite 
                                                                  
criminalized loansharking because it believed it to be a 
significant means by which enterprises engaged in organized crime 
"launder" the proceeds of their illegal activities.  Perez, 402 
U.S. at 149-50, 155-56.  The law did not require the government 
to prove that a particular extortionate extension of credit was 
made by a racketeer or that it had anything to do with interstate 
commerce.  Yet the Supreme Court found that Congress had 
reasonably believed that national efforts were required to combat 
organized crime.  The Court reviewed the significant amount of 
factual data that was before Congress when it enacted the law 
(id. at 155-56), but added that it did so "not to infer that 
Congress need make particularized findings in order to legislate. 
We relate the history of the Act in detail to answer the 
impassioned plea of petitioner that all that is involved in 
loansharking is a traditionally local activity" (id. at 156-57). 
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nexus with interstate commerce.  Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631 
(stating that the statute at issue had "no express jurisdictional 
element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm 
possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or 
effect interstate commerce.").  We must, therefore, determine 
whether the jurisdictional component in this case limits the 
statute to items that have an explicit connection with, or effect 
upon, interstate commerce.  We conclude that it does. 
 Because section 2119 is limited to cars that have 
traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Bass and Scarborough compel the conclusion that the 
jurisdictional element in section 2119 provides a nexus 
sufficient to protect the statute from constitutional infirmity. 
In Bass, the Court interpreted former 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (now 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), which had criminalized a felon's "recei[pt], 
possess[ion], or transport[ation] in commerce or affecting 
commerce . . . [of] any firearm."  Bass, 404 U.S. at 337.  Bass, 
a convicted felon, was convicted of possessing firearms, but the 
government had not alleged or proven that the firearms had been 
possessed in commerce or affecting commerce.  Before the Supreme 
Court, the government contended that it need not do so, since the 
phrase "in commerce or affecting commerce" modified only 
"transportation," and not "receipt" or "possession."  The Court 
found the statute to be ambiguous, and therefore applied two 
rules of construction.  First, the Court determined that, 
following the rule of lenity, it should construe section 1202(a) 
to require the government to prove that the "receipt" or 
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"possession" of a firearm were "in commerce or affecting 
commerce," just as it had to prove that a "transportation" of 
firearms met that qualification.  Id. at 347-48.  Second, it 
applied the rule that "unless Congress conveys its purpose 
clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the 
federal-state balance."  Id. at 349.  This principle, as well, 
counseled that the Court require the government to prove that 
Bass's possession of the firearms was in or affecting commerce. 
The government would meet this burden, the Court explained, if it 
"demonstrates that the firearm received has previously traveled 
in interstate commerce."  Id. at 350.  The Court recognized that 
this was "not the narrowest possible reading of the statute," but 
it found that, "given the evils that prompted the statute and the 
basic legislative purpose of restricting the firearm-related 
activity of convicted felons, the readings we give to the 
commerce requirement, although not all narrow, are appropriate." 
Id. at 351.  Since the government had not sought to prove any 
interstate nexus, Bass's conviction could not stand. 
 In Scarborough, the Supreme Court revisited former 
section 1202(a), this time to describe the nature of the proof 
required of the government in order to establish that a 
possession had been "in commerce or affecting commerce." 
Scarborough had been convicted of possessing firearms as a 
convicted felon, notwithstanding his argument that "proof that 
the firearms had at some time traveled in interstate commerce did 
not provide an adequate nexus between the possession and 
commerce."  Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 566.  The Court framed the 
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question presented as "whether proof that the possessed firearm 
previously traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to 
satisfy the statutorily required nexus between the possession of 
a firearm by a convicted felon and commerce."  Id. at 564.  To 
the Court, this question was one of simple statutory 
construction.  The Court reiterated that "Congress is aware of 
the `distinction between legislation limited to activities "in 
commerce" and an assertion of its full Commerce Clause power so 
as to cover all activity substantially affecting interstate 
commerce.'"  Id. at 571 (emphasis added), quoting United States 
v. American Bldg. Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271, 280 
(1975).  The Court noted that 
the purpose of [former section 1202(a)] was 
to proscribe mere possession but that there 
was some concern about the constitutionality 
of such a statute.  It was that observed 
ambivalence that made us unwilling in Bass to 
find the clear intent necessary to conclude 
that Congress meant to dispense with a nexus 
requirement entirely.  However, we see no 
indication that Congress intended to require 
any more than the minimal nexus that the 
firearm have been, at some time, in 
interstate commerce. 
Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 575.  The Court explained that it had 
decided not to follow dicta in Bass that had suggested that there 
might be a stricter nexus requirement for possession than for 
receipt of a firearm.  The Court noted that the requirement 
"would make sense, . . . but that that was not the choice 
Congress made.  Congress was not particularly concerned with the 
impact on commerce except as a means to insure the 
constitutionality of [section 1202(a)]."  Id. at 575 n.11.  Since 
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the government had proven that the firearms that Scarborough had 
possessed had at some time traveled in interstate commerce, the 
Court affirmed his conviction. 
 Bass and Scarborough did not directly address 
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, but certain 
principles are unmistakably inherent in those decisions.  In both 
decisions, the Court did not believe that its construction of 
former section 1202(a) raised any constitutional concern. Indeed, 
in Bass the Court believed that its construction saved the 
statute from possible constitutional infirmity.  Second, in 
Scarborough the Court equated Congress's insertion of the 
jurisdictional element in former section 1202(a) with fulfillment 
of the legislature's constitutional obligation to ensure that the 
statute fell within "its full Commerce Clause power . . . 
cover[ing] all activity substantially affecting interstate 
commerce."  Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 571 (emphasis added), 575 & 
n.11.  That is, although the Court in Scarborough did not 
explicate the constitutional underpinnings of its decision, it 
quite clearly found that a jurisdictional element like that in 
Scarborough ensured that each conviction had the requisite 
constitutional nexus with interstate commerce.  Had that not been 
the case, the Court would have had to construe the statute more 
narrowly, so as to avoid constitutional infirmity if at all 
possible.  See United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 
441, 448 (1953) (plurality opinion) ("The principle is old and 
deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence that this Court will 
construe a statute in a manner that requires decision of serious 
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constitutional questions only if the statutory language leaves no 
reasonable alternative"). 
 In Lopez, the Supreme Court confronted a statute 
(section 922(q)) similar to former section 1202(a), but without 
any language requiring that the government prove that the gun 
possessed in the school zone had been possessed in or affecting 
commerce.  The Court rued this omission, noting that the statute 
"contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through 
case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question 
affects interstate commerce."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.  The 
Court described Bass as an "example" of a case involving a 
statute that had such a jurisdictional element, but stated that, 
"[u]nlike the statute in Bass, § 922(q) has no express 
jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete 
set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit 
connection with or effect on interstate commerce."  Lopez, 115 S. 
Ct. at 1631. 
 Section 2119 has an element that ensures that the motor 
vehicle involved in the carjacking has "an explicit connection 
with or effect on interstate commerce" just like the firearms in 
Bass and Scarborough.0  In what was likely an attempt to follow 
                     
0
 The fact that the motor vehicle involved in a carjacking 
had once been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or 
foreign commerce provides no less nexus between a carjacking and 
interstate commerce than the fact that a firearm once traveled in 
interstate commerce provides with respect to possession of that 
firearm by a felon.  In both cases, the jurisdictional element is 
not directed at the activity sought to be punished, but rather at 
an element necessary to the crime but unrelated to the culpable 
behavior. 
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these decisions -- and particularly Scarborough, which found that 
jurisdiction was satisfied by the mere proof that the possessed 
firearm had previously traveled in interstate commerce --Congress 
required that the government prove that the stolen motor vehicle 
"had been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or 
foreign commerce" in order to secure a conviction. 
 Appellants attempt to escape the implications of Bass 
and Scarborough by arguing that jurisdictional elements like the 
one in section 2119 were construed by the Court in Lopez "to 
require a case-by-case inquiry that the criminal act in question 
affects interstate commerce."  Bishop Supp. Br. 11.  We do not 
believe that the Court intended that distinction, however, and we 
think it unlikely to have done so given the clear statement in 
Scarborough establishing that the jurisdictional element in 
former section 1202(a) (the travel of a firearm in interstate 
commerce) had nothing to do with the wrong sought to be curbed 
(possession of guns by felons).  Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 572.0 
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 We thus reject any attempt to distinguish Scarborough and 
Bass on the ground that Congress, in enacting the felon-in-
possession statute, was "directed ultimately at stopping the 
interstate trading of weapons which land in the hands of felons." 
Stokes Supp. Br. 11.  Stokes has no authority for the proposition 
that Congress, in prohibiting possession of guns by felons, was 
aiming at the movement of guns towards felons, rather than the 
possession of guns by felons.  As stated in the text, Scarborough 
stated quite the opposite. 
 
 We also reject Stokes' attempt to distinguish Scarborough 
on the ground that it dealt with firearms, which are "inherently 
deadly and dangerous objects" which Congress is empowered to 
regulate "just as it may regulate any offensive interstate 
trade."  Stokes Supp. Br. 11.  The dangerousness of the object is 
not the source of Congressional power; the connection to 
interstate commerce is.  See generally Lopez, passim. 
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In Scarborough and Bass, the Court found it sufficient for 
Commerce Clause purposes for Congress to require the government 
to establish the nexus with interstate commerce by proving a 
jurisdictional element unrelated to the culpable behavior.  Had 
the Court in Lopez intended to fundamentally change the law and 
require a closer connection between the jurisdictional element 
and the culpable conduct, one would have expected it to have been 
more explicit.0 
 The necessary implication of Bass and Scarborough is 
that the jurisdictional element in section 2119 independently 
refutes appellants' arguments that the statute is 
constitutionally infirm.  We therefore join other courts of 
appeals in upholding the statute on this ground, as well.  See 
United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398, 1401 n.3 (9th Cir. 
1995); (relying on Scarborough to uphold the statute); United 
States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 106, 108-09 (6th Cir. 1994). 
B. 
 The government also argues that the statute passes 
constitutional muster under Category Two (to wit, that Congress 
can regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons 
and things in interstate commerce) because motor vehicles are 
                     
0
 Until that time, we are not at liberty to overrule existing 
Supreme Court precedent.  As Justice Kennedy explained, "If a 
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet 
appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which 
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions."  Rodriguez De Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
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"the quintessential instrumentalities of modern interstate 
commerce."  Again, we agree.0 
 The Supreme Court has made clear that airplanes, 
railroads, highways and bridges constitute instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce which Congress can regulate under the 
Commerce Clause.  E.g. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1629 (airplanes); 
Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (railroads); Alstate 
Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953) (highways); Overstreet 
v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 129 (1943) (intrastate bridge 
over navigable waterway).0  Congress may regulate threats to 
these instrumentalities "even though the threat may come only 
from intrastate activities."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629. 
Instrumentalities differ from other objects that affect 
interstate commerce because they are used as a means of 
                     
0
 As we have previously noted (supra p. 16), Lopez involved 
only a regulation that was justified, if at all, under Category 
Three.  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.  As such, Lopez does not 
affect our analysis here.  See generally United States v. 
Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995) (noting that "effects" test has 
no role outside of cases involving intrastate activities that are 
regulated because of their substantial effects upon interstate 
commerce). 
0
 The dissent criticizes us for citing to opinions that 
interpret federal statutory language that Congress included to 
ensure the statutes did not exceed Congress' Commerce Clause 
power.  However, the dissent fails to acknowledge that each 
opinion, in order to decide the statutory question involved, 
explicitly recognizes the foregoing mediums of transportation to 
be instrumentalities of interstate commerce.  Moreover, unlike 
the dissent, we do not believe that the Court would conclude that 
activities which fell within each statute's jurisdictional 
language would fall outside of Congress' Commerce Clause power. 
If the Court did, it would have overlooked its own command to 
read statutes narrowly to avoid possible constitutional 
infirmities whenever possible.  See United States v. Five 
Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 448 (1953) (plurality opinion). 
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transporting goods and people across state lines.  Trains and 
planes are inherently mobile; highways and bridges, though 
static, are critical to the movement of automobiles.  It would be 
anomalous, therefore, to recognize these categories of 
instrumentalities but to suggest that the similarly mobile 
automobile is not also an instrumentality of interstate commerce. 
 Notably, none of the instrumentalities we have 
mentioned are used exclusively as interstate conduits.  Railroads 
often transport goods between two points within a state, 
especially in such large states as Pennsylvania, California, 
Alaska and Texas.  Cessna aircraft fly from Pittsburgh to 
Philadelphia, never leaving the airspace of Pennsylvania, just as 
countless flights shuttle daily between Houston and Dallas or Los 
Angeles and San Francisco.  Highways are used at least as often 
to travel within states as among them.  Therefore, the fact that 
automobiles are often used for intrastate travel does not 
differentiate them from these other instrumentalities.0 
 Stokes argues that "motor vehicles are not inherently 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce which justify any 
regulation which involves them in any way.  Rather, they can be 
regulated as instrumentalities of interstate commerce only when 
the regulation directs itself to a specific interstate function." 
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 Nor would we find it compelling if we were shown that a 
greater percentage of railcars or airplanes travel interstate on 
any given day than the percentage of automobiles that travel 
interstate on any given day.  To the contrary, we are confident 
that a far greater volume of people and goods are transported 
interstate by means of motor vehicles than by railroads or 
airplanes. 
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Stokes Supp. Br. 8.  The dissent agrees, arguing that Congress 
could only protect motor vehicles against intrastate threats such 
as carjacking if the car was traveling in interstate commerce. 
Dissent at 20.0  In Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 
20 (1911), the Supreme Court rejected the same distinction 
between vehicles that are traveling in interstate commerce and 
vehicles which, though capable of interstate travel, are 
traveling intrastate when regulated.  In Southern R. Co., the 
Court recognized that Congress had the power to regulate boxcars 
that traveled exclusively intrastate because of their inherent 
mobility and connection to interstate commerce.  "[I]t is no 
objection to such an exertion of [Commerce Clause] power that the 
dangers intended to be avoided arise, in whole or in part, out of 
matters connected with intrastate commerce."  Id. at 26. 
Similarly, in the Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), the 
Court recognized Congress' power to regulate rates for completely 
intrastate rail trips.  Finally, in Overstreet v. North Shore 
Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943), the Supreme Court found that a wholly 
                     
0
 Notably, the dissent points to the language of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 32, which prohibits destruction of civil aircraft "used, 
operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air 
commerce."  This statute does not limit its scope to civil 
aircraft which are traveling interstate at the time of attack. 
"Congress intended not only to protect civil aircraft while 
actually operating in interstate commerce, but also to protect 
such as is used or employed in interstate commerce, and also the 
parts, materials and facilities used by such aircraft." United 
States v. Hume, 453 F.2d 339, 340 (1971) (per curiam) (emphasis 
added).  As § 32 thus reflects, the power to regulate 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce is the power to regulate 
vehicles used in interstate commerce, i.e. that have traveled, do 
travel, or will travel in interstate commerce whether or not they 
are actually traveling in interstate commerce when regulated. 
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intrastate bridge that connected an island to a road that then 
connected to an interstate highway was an instrumentality of 
interstate commerce despite the fact that goods, when they 
traveled over the bridge, necessarily traveled in intrastate 
commerce.  Thus, Stokes, Bishop, and the dissent mistake 
Congress' power to regulate instrumentalities as a power to 
regulate vehicles only when those instrumentalities are being 
used in interstate commerce when Congress' power, in fact, 
derives from the objects' status as instrumentalities. 
 Stokes relies upon United States v. Heightland, 865 
F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1989), which he believes supports his assertion 
that motor vehicles are instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
"only in their interstate role."  However, in Heightland the 
Sixth Circuit was addressing whether the assault and murder of a 
truck driver at a coal mine endangered a motor vehicle "which was 
used, operated, or employed" in interstate commerce.  18 U.S.C. 
§ 33.  That the truck was accosted on an intrastate journey, 
carrying coal ultimately headed to Virginia, was one factor the 
court used in determining whether the truck was used in 
interstate commerce, but the court did not state that an 
interstate destination was a requirement of the statute or of the 
Commerce Clause.  Id. at 96.  To the contrary, the court noted 
the broad intent of Congress to "vindicat[e] these offenses, 
which often take place in remote areas where State law 
enforcement may not be effective."  Id., quoting 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3500).  Heightland certainly does not state that 
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motor vehicles are only instrumentalities when bound on 
interstate journeys. 
 We are also unpersuaded that intrastate air and rail 
travel can be regulated as part of a "seamless web" but motor 
vehicle travel cannot -- i.e., that poorly maintained intrastate 
boxcars endanger other instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
while carjacking does not.  We recognize, of course, that 
airspace is limited and requires more careful management to 
protect interstate commerce.  Yet as between boxcars and ordinary 
cars, the distinction breaks down.  A carjacker in Newark does 
not differentiate between commuters from New York as compared to 
commuters from Hackensack.  A resident from Cherry Hill, New 
Jersey is just as subject to carjacking in Philadelphia as a 
resident of Bucks County.  In short, the danger which carjacking 
presents to the use of a motor vehicle as an instrumentality of 
commerce is presented to both interstate and intrastate drivers, 
passengers and goods.0 
 As Chief Justice Taft recognized nearly three-quarters 
of a century ago, the introduction of the automobile ushered in 
"a radical change in transportation of persons and goods . . . ." 
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 , 438 (1925).  In the 
present age, cars represent Americans' primary mode of 
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 The dissent argues that Congress may only regulate vehicles 
which have been hired to travel across state lines.  In doing so, 
the dissent excludes from interstate commerce all commuters and 
salespeople who drive across state lines to reach their place of 
work and their costumers.  We do not find such a limitation 
reasonable or warranted by any precedential authority, nor does 
the dissent cite any to support its limitation. 
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transportation, both within and among the States.  See, e.g., 
Thoms, Amtrak:  Rail Renaissance or Requiem?  49 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 
29, 30 (1972) ("The decline of railroad passenger service is a 
familiar story.  The automobile has replaced all other vehicles 
as the dominant mode of transportation").  Commuters, salespeople 
and haulers rely upon motor vehicles daily to maintain the flow 
of commerce; see also U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States:  1994 at 622 Table No. 994 
(private automobiles accounted for 1,663 billion passenger-miles 
of intercity passenger traffic in 1992, whereas domestic airways 
accounted for 367, buses 24, and railroads 14). 
 As such, we can only conclude that motor vehicles are 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.  Thus, Congress may 
criminalize activities affecting their use even though the 
wrongful conduct, such as carjacking, occurs wholly intrastate. 
Because section 2119 is such a regulation, it is constitutional 
on that basis as well.  
C. 
 Appellants contend that the Supreme Court's Lopez 
decision is a sharp break with the Court's precedents.  According 
to them, "the Lopez decision is a strong signal to the lower 
courts to eschew a casual calculus of whether interstate commerce 
is substantially implicated in a federal statutory scheme in 
favor of a carefully considered factual determination."  Bishop 
Supp. Br. 2.  We, however, do not believe that Lopez calls for 
federal courts to supplant Congressional judgments with their 
own.  That would, indeed, be a profound departure from prior law, 
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and it is important to keep in mind that Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor, who fully concurred in the majority opinion, did not 
view the majority that way.  Rather, Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor counseled "great restraint" before a court finds 
Congress to have overstepped its commerce power, and believed the 
Court's opinion to have been a "necessary though limited 
holding."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Thus, despite protestations to the contrary, the winds have not 
shifted that much. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. KEVIN BISHOP, No. 94-5321 and 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. EDWARD STOKES, No. 94-5387. 
BECKER, Circuit Judge.  Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part. 
 Carjacking is a heinous offense -- violent and extremely frightening.  
Accordingly, I can well understand the anger and frustration that impelled Congress to 
enact 18 U.S.C. § 2119, thereby making carjacking a federal crime.  Nevertheless, I cannot 
agree with the majority that Congress had the authority to enact this statute under its 
constitutional power "to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States. . . . "  U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 Numerous carjackings occur in this country every year, and I acknowledge the 
force of the anecdotal evidence reported by the majority to the effect that at least some 
carjacked vehicles end up in "chop shops."  Carjacking may therefore be said to 
contribute, in some degree, to the operation of the interstate car-theft rings that 
Congress sought to regulate by the Anti-Car-theft Act of 1992, of which § 2119 was a part.  
A careful reading of this Act's legislative history, however, precludes any 
misidentification of the concerns that motivated Congress's enactment of this provision.  
Whatever justifications the majority may now proffer, it is clear that Congress enacted 
the carjacking statute as a response to its accurate perception of carjacking as a crime 
of violence.  And in the a
bsence of congressional findings to the contrary -- none are in evidence here -- the 
majority's conclusion that Congress could have rationally believed that prosecuting 
carjacking was an essential part of dealing with a larger economic burden on interstate 
commerce (i.e., interstate car-theft rings) and that carjacking itself, therefore, 
substantially affects interstate commerce, borders on gossamer.  
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 I do not gainsay that six months ago the majority's opinion would have carried 
the day.  But that was before United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), which, 
fairly read, reflects a sea change in the Supreme Court's approach to these types of 
questions.  That view is widely shared by the media in general and the legal press in 
particular.0  In contrast, the majority views Lopez as either a narrow decision or 
something of a "sport."  The majority observes, referencing the separate opinions of 
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, that "despite protestations to the contrary, the winds have 
not shifted that much."  This passage is apparently meant to suggest that Justices 
O'Connor and Kennedy form an intermediate bloc which would view Lopez as case-specific.  I 
remind my colleagues, however, that both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined in the Chief 
Justice's opinion.  Since five is more than four, I view Lopez as a beacon that we must 
follow, and the direction in which the beacon points compels my vote to invalidate the 
carjacking statute as beyond the broad reach of Congress's Commerce Clause power.  
 In particular, all five justices in the Lopez majority refused to apply the 
Court's previous caselaw "upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are 
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially 
affects interstate commerce," to "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do 
with `commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. In so 
doing the Court required "a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or 
                     
0See e.g. Bennett L. Gershman, Judicial "Conservatism", N.Y. L. J. 2 (June 21, 1995) ("In 
Lopez, the Court may have uprooted nearly 60 years of Commerce Clause jurisprudence."); 
Herman Schwartz, Court Abandons Rational-Basis Test, LEGAL TIMES 25-26 (May 8, 1995) ("The 
imposition of judicial limits on Congress' commerce clause regulation of private 
activities thus marks a major shift in judicial attitude." (emphasis added)); Dean James 
L. Huffman, Lopez Pops Feds Ballooning Powers, NAT'L L. J. A21 (May 22, 1995) ("The 
holding, even as cautiously explained by Chief Justice Rehnquist . . . is, as Justice John 
P. Stevens says in dissent, "radical."  There is no other way to reverse nearly 60 years 
of total deference to Congress on the meaning of the commerce clause." (emphasis added)); 
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Judging with Pinpoint Accuracy, THE RECORDER 10 (May 8, 1995) 
(rescribing the comment of Yale Law Professor Bruce Ackerman describing Lopez as "one of 
the opening cannonades in the coming constitutional revolution"). 
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noncommercial."  Id. at 1633.  If the intrastate activity is commercial, the "substantial 
effects" jurisprudence applies, allowing Congress to regulate the activity if it in 
aggregate substantially affects interstate commerce; otherwise, the doctrine is 
inapplicable and affords Congress no basis for regulation.  In spite of Lopez's limitation 
on the application of its "substantial effects" jurisprudence to intrastate commercial 
activity, the majority upholds the constitutionality of § 2119 by concluding that 
carjacking, a violent criminal activity, is a commercial transaction.  See maj. op. at 27.  
 I disagree with this conclusion, for I read the Lopez Court's reference to a 
"commercial transaction" as referring to a voluntary economic exchange.  I am reinforced 
in this view by the fact that the majority runs afoul of the Lopez Court's admonition that 
any definition of "commercial" must be one that provides "real limits" on the scope of 
Commerce Clause authority.  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.  Yet, under the majority's broad 
definition of commercial transaction, Congress could clearly constitutionally federalize 
all intrastate car-theft, all intrastate crimes of theft, and perhaps nearly all criminal 
activity occurring within a state.  The majority's arguments prove far too much. 
 Moreover, in the wake of Lopez, I believe that a criminal statute such as 
§ 2119, which does not involve a commercial transaction, cannot be upheld as the majority 
tries to do -- by piling inference upon inference to construct from anecdotal data an 
argument that carjacking is an essential part of the operation of car-theft rings.  
Rather, non-commercial enactments, such as § 2119, should only be upheld to the extent 
that adequate data, available either by way of congressional findings or otherwise, 
establishes that the proscribed non-commercial activity has a sufficient relationship to 
interstate commercial activity. 
 Importantly, the Supreme Court recognized in Lopez that "[u]nder our federal 
system the administration of criminal justice rests with the States . . . .  When Congress 
criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it effects a `change in 
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the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.'"  Lopez, 115 S. 
Ct. at 1631 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993)) (citations 
omitted).0  In this case, state law already directly governs the defendants' conduct,
since New Jersey, like many of it sister states,0 has criminalized carjacking.0  In 
                     
0Similar sentiments are echoed in the recently submitted "Proposed Long Range Plan for the 
Federal Courts": 
 
Congress should commit itself to conserving the federal courts as a 
distinctive judicial forum of limited jurisdiction in our system of 
federalism.  Civil and criminal jurisdiction should be assigned to the 
federal courts only to further clearly defined and justified national 
interests, leaving to the state courts responsibility for adjudicating 
all other matters. . . . In principle, criminal activity should be 
prosecuted in a federal court only in those instances in which state 
court prosecution is not appropriate or where federal interests are 
paramount. 
 
COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING -- JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 23 (March 1995). See also Thomas M. Mengler, "The Sad Refrain of Tough on 
Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State 
Crime," 43 U. KANSAS L. REV. 503 (1995). 
0In fact, as the government concedes, the New Jersey criminal penalty exceeds the penalty 
provided by the federal carjacking statute in this case. 
0See, e.g. CAL. PEN. CODE § 215 (1995); 11 DEL. C. § 222 (1994); D.C. CODE § 22-2903 (1994); 
FLA. STAT. § 812.133 (1994); BURNS IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-5-2 (1994); LA. REV. STAT. 14:64.2 
(1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 348A (1994); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 21A (1995); MISS
ANN. § 97-3-117 (1993); SOUTH CAR. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1075 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58.1 
(1995). 
0The defendants could be prosecuted under NJ § 2C:15-2, which provides:  
   A. CARJACKING DEFINED. A person is guilty of carjacking if in the 
course of committing an unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, as defined 
in N.J.S. 39:1-1, or in an attempt to commit an unlawful taking of a 
motor vehicle he:    
   (1) inflicts bodily injury or uses force upon an occupant or person 
in possession or control of a motor vehicle;  
   (2) threatens an occupant or person in control with, or purposely 
or knowingly puts an occupant or person in control of the motor 
vehicle in fear of, immediate bodily injury;  
   (3) commits or threatens immediately to commit any crime of the 
first or second degree; or    
   (4) operates or causes said vehicle to be operated with the person 
who was in possession or control or was an occupant of the motor 
vehicle at the time of the taking remaining in the vehicle.  An act 
shall be deemed to be "in the course of committing an unlawful taking 
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enacting this criminal statute, Congress improperly interfered with the primary authority 
of New Jersey to define and enforce its criminal code. Intrastate crimes of violence, like 
the carjacking in this case, are properly left to the states, whose law enforcement 
agencies and courts are well suited to handle such criminal activity.0  
 In Part III I will explain in still greater detail why I conclude that the 
carjacking statute cannot be justified as substantially affecting interstate commerce.  
But before reaching that issue, I will first take up the points advanced by the government 
as the two primary bases for upholding the carjacking statute, neither of which, I submit, 
are sufficient to uphold § 2119 under the Commerce Clause.  First, I examine the 
majority's reliance on Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 97 S. Ct. 1963 (1977), 
and demonstrate why the fact that the Dodge Shadow carjacked here once travelled in 
interstate commerce is not a sufficient interstate nexus to render this statute 
constitutional under the Commerce Clause.  Then, in part II, I explain why § 2119 cannot 
be justified as a regulation of an instrumentality of interstate commerce.  Because I 
agree with the majority's discussion of the double jeopardy issue, I join in Part II of 
the majority's opinion, and to that extent this is a concurring as well as dissenting 
opinion. 
                                                                                          
of a motor vehicle" if it occurs during an attempt to commit the 
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle or during an immediate flight after 
the attempt or commission.  
 
B. GRADING. Carjacking is a crime of the first degree and upon 
conviction thereof a person may, notwithstanding the provisions of 
paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:43-6, be sentenced to an 
ordinary term of imprisonment between 10 and 30 years. A person 
convicted of carjacking shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
and that term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a 
minimum term of at least five years during which the defendant shall 
be ineligible for parole. 
 
N.J. Stat. § 2C:15-2 (1994). 
0Not surprisingly, local, as opposed to federal, law enforcement officials made the 
arrests in this case.   
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1.  THE SCARBOROUGH ARGUMENT  
 In October of 1992, as a part of the Anti-Car-Theft Act, P.L. 102-519, Congress 
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2119, which provides: 
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, 
takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped or received 
in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of 
another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do 
so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .  
 
18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).  The majority correctly recognizes 
that this provision differs from § 922(q), the statute involved in Lopez, since § 2119 
contains a jurisdictional element -- the requirement that the accused "take[] a motor 
vehicle that has been transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign commerce" 
-- which § 922(q) lacked.   
 The majority goes on to state that  
 The mere presence of a jurisdictional element, however, does not 
in and of itself insulate a statute from judicial scrutiny under the 
Commerce Clause, or render it per se constitutional.  To the contrary, 
courts must inquire further to determine whether the jurisdictional 
element has the requisite nexus with interstate commerce. 
 
Following on, it reasons that it: 
must, therefore, determine whether the jurisdictional component in 
this case limits the statute to items that have an explicit connection 
with, or effect upon, interstate commerce.   
 
The court concludes that it does. 
 
 These protestations are laudable, but they stand in sharp contrast to the 
discussion that follows which does not support them.  Rather, I believe that the 
majority's essential reasoning, like that of  the Ninth Circuit in United State v. Oliver
__ F.3d ___, ___ (9th Cir. 1995) [1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 16432], is that the presence of 
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this statutory element itself renders § 2119 constitutional,0 reasoning which supports the 
government's contention that Lopez would have been decided differently by the Court had 
§ 922(q) (which prohibited the possession of a gun within a 1000 feet of a school) simply 
contained a requirement that the gun had at some point been transported in interstate 
commerce.  
 I cannot agree that the force of the Lopez decision is so restricted.  That is 
because, in order for a particular congressional enactment regulating an intrastate 
activity to pass constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause, the enactment must still 
fit within one of the three enumerated categories of congressional power.  The 
jurisdictional element in such cases functions only to narrow the class of regulated 
activity.  As the Court in Lopez recognized, in distinguishing prior case law, § 922(q) 
"contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that
the [regulated conduct] affects interstate commerce."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (emphasis 
added).  In other words, a jurisdictional element functions only to limit the regulation 
to interstate activity or to ensure that the intrastate activity which is regulated 
satisfies one of the three tests of congressional power.  Section 2119 fails in this 
regard, since this provision regulates intrastate activity0 and the jurisdictional element 
                     
0While the majority does not address the subject, I will assume that this jurisdictional 
element requires the government to establish that "a fully assembled `motor vehicle' has 
been transported in interstate commerce rather than . . . [merely requiring a showing 
that] either the `motor vehicle' or the motor vehicle's parts, prior to assembly, moved in 
interstate commerce."  United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 956-57 (8th Cir. 1995).
0In this regard, § 2119's jurisdictional requirement is distinguishable from a requirement 
that the regulated entity actually be "engaged in interstate commerce."  See United States 
v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1732-33 (1995) (per curiam) (examining the question 
a regulated entity was "engaged in interstate commerce").  If § 2119 contained such a 
requirement, the government would need to establish that the defendants were in fact 
working as a part of a car-theft ring engaged in interstate commerce.  While such a 
requirement would render § 2119 constitutional, the statute, as enacted, simply lacks any 
requirement that the regulated person(s) be engaged in interstate commerce.   
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in no way limits the statute's application to ensure that it fits within one of the three 
branches of congressional Commerce Clause authority.   
 The majority, like the Oliver court, simply offers no analysis as to how  
§ 2119's jurisdictional element limits, in any relevant manner, the crime of carjacking so 
that it fits within one of the three enumerated branches of congressional authority.  
Rather, both opinions rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in Scarborough v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 563, 97 S. Ct. 1963 (1977), which the majority candidly admits did not 
engage in any analysis of the authority of Congress to enact laws under the Commerce 
Clause. 0 
 As the majority recognizes, the Scarborough decision expanded upon the Court's 
prior opinion in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 92 S. Ct. 515 (1971), which, like 
Scarborough, involved what was then § 1202(a) of Title 18.  This provision provided that 
any convicted felon "who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting 
commerce . . . any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for no
than two years, or both."  In Bass, the "Government proceeded on the assumption that 
§ 1202(a)(1) banned all possessions and receipts of firearms by convicted felons, and that 
no connection with interstate commerce had to be demonstrated in individual cases."  
404 U.S. at 338, 92 S. Ct. at 517.  In response to this argument, the defendant contended 
that "the statute did not reach possession of a firearm not shown to have been `in 
commerce or affecting commerce,' and that, if it did, Congress had overstepped its 
constitutional powers under the Commerce Clause." Bass, 404 U.S. at 338, 92 S. Ct. at 518.  
                     
0Indeed the majority summarily concludes: 
 Because section 2119 is limited to cars that have traveled in 
interstate or foreign commerce, the Supreme Court's decisions in Bass 
and Scarborough compel the conclusion that the jurisdictional element 
in section 2119 provides a nexus sufficient to protect the statute 




 The Court rejected the government's interpretation of the statute, refusing to 
adopt the government's "broad reading in the absence of a clearer direction from 
Congress," because the statute's "sanctions are criminal and because, under the 
Government's broader reading, the statute would mark a major inroad into a domain 
traditionally left to the States."  Id. at 339, 92 S. Ct. at 518.  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that "the commerce requirement in § 1202(a) must be read as part of the 
`possesses' and `receives' offenses."  Id. at 350, 92 S. Ct. at 524; id. ("Absent a 
clearer statement of intention from Congress than is present here, we do not interpret 
§ 1202(a) to reach the `mere possession' of firearms.").  The Court reasoned that 
"[a]bsent proof of some interstate commerce nexus in each case, § 1202(a) dramatically 
intrudes upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction."  Id.  Because the government had 
not proven even the minimal nexus that the Court held the statute to require, the Court 
overturned the conviction, and thus "d[id] not reach the question whether, upon 
appropriate findings, Congress can constitutionally punish the `mere possession' of 
firearms."  Id. at 339 n.4, 92 S. Ct. at 518 n.4.  
 Following Bass, the Court confronted in Scarborough the question of how the 
government might satisfy its statutory burden under the Bass Court's reading of the 
statute, which required that a defendant possess the weapon "in commerce or affecting 
commerce."
0
  Through a careful parsing of § 1202(a)'s legislative history, the Court 
concluded that in order to be convicted under the statute, the government need only prove 
that "the firearm possessed by the convicted felon traveled at some time in interstate 
commerce."  Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 568, 97 S. Ct. at 1966.   
                     
0In Bass, the Court noted, by way of example, that the government could satisfy this 
burden under the statute, "if at the time of the offense the gun was moving interstate or 
on an interstate facility, or if the possession affects commerce." Bass, 404 U.S. at 350, 
92 S. Ct. at 524. 
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 That decision, as the majority concedes, was exclusively one of statutory 
construction, explicating the intent of Congress in enacting § 1202(a).  The Court's 
entire analysis focused on this issue of congressional intent -- what Congress required by 
the phrase "in commerce or affecting commerce." Noticeably absent from the opinion, as the 
majority recognizes, is any analysis of whether the activity regulated by the statute 
constitutes a constitutional exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.  
Given this fact, the relevance of the Scarborough decision to Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence is dubious.0  I agree that the Commerce Clause issue was implicit in the 
result reached by the Scarborough Court, which upheld the conviction.0  However, the 
majority errs in relying on a putative holding of Scarborough (perhaps "phantom holding" 
might be more apt) to conclude that the interstate jurisdiction element renders the 
statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause.0  
                     
0The Lopez Court observed that "[u]nlike the statute in Bass, § 922(q) has no express 
jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm 
possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate 
commerce."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (emphasis added).  This statement is consistent with 
the requirement that the jurisdictional element limit the regulation to interstate 
activity or ensure that the regulated intrastate activity fall within one of three 
categories of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.   
0I do note that though the Commerce Clause issue easily could have been mentioned, it was 
not. 
0Notwithstanding the fact that the Court's decision in Scarborough was devoid of any 
Commerce Clause analysis, the majority supports its unflinching application in this case 
by relying on language in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 
477, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989), where the Court cautioned: "If a precedent of this Court 
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line 
of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving 
to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."  490 U.S. at 484, 109 S. 
Ct. at 1921-22 (emphasis added).  In Rodriguez, the Court of Appeals had concluded that "a 
predispute agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933" was 
enforceable, and did not "requir[e] resolution of the claims . . . in a judicial forum," 
despite that fact that previously in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S. Ct. 182 (1953), 
the Supreme Court had held that "an agreement to arbitrate future controversies" under the 
Securities Act of 1933 was "void" under § 14 of that Act.  Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 479, 109 
S. Ct. at 1919.  The Court of Appeals had reasoned that while subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions had not directly addressed the holding of Wilko, which was directly applicable, 
subsequent decisions had reduced Wilko to "obsolescence."  Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
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 Even if it were proper to rely on Scarborough as Commerce Clause precedent, the 
majority errs, in my view, in defining the scope of Scarborough's putative Commerce Clause 
holding as broadly as it does, because § 1202(a) is distinguishable from § 2119.  Section 
§ 1202(a)'s jurisdictional requirement could, more properly, be viewed as a rational 
restriction on the illegal interstate trade in guns pursuant to the first branch of 
Congress's Commerce Clause authority, the well established "authority of Congress to keep 
the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses . . . ." Lopez
115 S. Ct. at 1629 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 
256, 85 S. Ct. 348, 357 (1964)). At the time of the enactment of § 1202(a), federal law 
prohibited the sale of guns to felons.  See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (1976) (providing that it 
shall be unlawful for a licensed gun distributor to sell or give a firearm to a person 
under indictment for or convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year).  A fortiori, felons who had purchased their weapons after their 
felony conviction would have done so through illegal channels.  Accordingly, § 1202(a), 
which prohibited felons from possessing a gun that traveled in interstate commerce, could 
have constituted a rational means for Congress to deal with illegal interstate trafficking 
in guns.  
 Section 2119, in contrast, cannot be justified in this fashion.  Its 
jurisdictional element limits the reach of the carjacking statute to automobiles that have 
legitimately traveled in interstate commerce.  But, we cannot rationally conclude that 
                                                                                          
Shearson/Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1988).  While I acknowledge 
the binding nature of this decision, it is clearly distinguishable.  Scarborough, a 
decision analyzing the legislative intent surrounding the enactment of § 1202(a) (a 
statute since repealed by Congress) and devoid of any Commerce Clause analysis, simply 
cannot have "direct application" in a case concerning the power of Congress to enact a 
federal carjacking statute under its Commerce Clause power. Moreover, while the broad 
application of the statute in Scarborough is probably undermined by Lopez, my contention 
that Scarborough is inapplicable to this action does not arise from the Court's decision 
in Lopez.  
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Congress seeks to regulate legitimate interstate trade in automobiles from manufacturer to 
dealer or from dealer to victim. Rather, § 2119 extends solely to intrastate criminal 
activity, which bears no rational nexus to the fact that the automobile in question was at 
some point legitimately shipped interstate. Hence, the jurisdictional element does not in 
any way rationally limit the class of activity Congress seeks to regulate.  The concerns 
motivating Congress to enact § 2119 are the same whether the automobile was manufactured 
within the state where the crime occurred or elsewhere.0  
 The reasoning of the majority and the Oliver court, which would essentially 
permit Congress to regulate any activity so long as the statute contains some interstate 
jurisdictional element (no matter how tenuous its relation to the regulated activity), is 
simply too broad.  The majority's holding effectively renders the Supreme Court's three
part Commerce Clause analysis superfluous, and permits Congress, through the inclusion of 
a meaningless interstate commerce provision, to "convert congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States."  Lopez
S. Ct. at 1634.  For instance, the majority's logic would permit a federal law outlawing 
the theft of a Hershey kiss from a corner store in Youngstown, Ohio by a neighborhood 
juvenile on the basis that the candy once traveled in interstate commerce to the store 
from Hershey, Pennsylvania.  Similarly, the majority's broad reading would vest Congress 
with power under the Commerce Clause to enact a federal law requiring students in private 
schools to read their homework assignments, so long as the government establishes that the 
                     
0The improvidence of the majority's reliance on the jurisdictional requirement is 
demonstrated by the fact that Congress, in enacting § 2119, expressed concern that "[i]n a 
single week last year in Detroit, 74 cars were stolen in armed carjackings."  H.R. 
851, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 15, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829, 2831.  It defies logic to 
assert that Congress rationally sought to criminalize only those carjackings occurring in 
Detroit which involved these relatively few cars in Michigan manufactured outside of the 
state.  
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textbooks were published in another state.0  The majority's reasoning destroys any 
"distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 
at 1634.0 
 Accordingly, I conclude that § 2119 would constitute a constitutional exercise 
of congressional authority only if the intrastate activity regulated fit within one of the 
"three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power."  
Lopez at 1629.  In upholding this conviction, the majority relies on two of these three 
categories, concluding that § 2119 is constitutional under Congress's power (1) to 
"regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce," and (2) to regulate 
those activities with a "substantial effect on interstate commerce."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 
1629-30.  I take both of these rationales up in turn.  
2.  INSTRUMENTALITIES OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE  
 Despite the fact that § 2119 does not govern the use of automobiles as 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, the majority, again joining the Ninth Circuit in 
Oliver, __ F.3d at ___, upholds the constitutionality of the statute on the theory that 
                     
0See Paul D. Kamenar, The Feds Lose a Piece of Their Rock; Commerce Clause Should Nor Be 
Infinite, LEGAL TIMES 25 (May 3, 1995) (recounting the criticism of commentator George Will 
that under the Lopez dissent's broad reading of Commerce Clause authority, Congress could 
"pass a federal law requiring students to do their homework"). 
0In overturning § 2119 as beyond the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause authority in 
United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), rev'd 30 F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 
1994), Judge Wiseman had a similar view of this argument: 
 
To say . . . that because something once traveled in interstate 
commerce it remains in interstate commerce after coming to rest in a 
given state is sheer sophistry. . . . [I]f it is sufficient to invoke 
the powers of the Commerce Clause that something has been manufactured 
outside of the state of Tennessee and previously transported here, 90% 
of the merchandise on every merchant's shelf will qualify and any 
robbery of any store can be federalized by the Congress under this 
rationale. 
 
Id. at 243.  
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automobiles often are used as instrumentalities of interstate commerce.  In so doing, the 
majority dramatically expands the scope of Congress's power under this branch of Comm
Clause authority.  
 The majority correctly recognizes that "Congress is empowered to regulate and 
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities." Lopez, 115 S. 
Ct. at 1629.  However, in crafting the scope of this category of congressional authority, 
courts have, to date, appropriately limited its application to congressional regulation of 
instrumentalities actually engaged in interstate commerce, or objects such as railcars or 
railway bridges, which are integrally related to an interstate commerce network.  While 
automobiles can indeed be used to engage in interstate commerce (and an automobile need 
not be travelling interstate to be used in interstate commerce), the federal carjacking 
statute, unlike those statutes upheld in prior cases, in no way regulates 
instrumentalities in any way engaged in interstate commerce. Rather, § 2119 is a criminal 
statute of general application, which, by its terms, lacks any nexus to the use of 
automobiles in interstate commerce. 
 In my view, congressional authority under this branch of its Commerce Clause 
power has been shaped by two cases, cited by the Supreme Court in Lopez -- Southern 
Railroad Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 S. Ct. 2 (1911) and Shreveport Rate Cases
234 U.S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833 (1914) -- and by a statement in dicta in Perez v. United 
States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 91 S. Ct. 1357, 1359 (1971) (Perez was a "substantial effects" 
decision, see discussion infra). 
 The first of these cases, Southern R.R., involved the application of the Safety 
Appliance Act to a non-conforming railroad car used solely for hauling within one state, 
on "`a part of a through highway' over which traffic was continually being moved from one 
State to another."  222 U.S. at 23, 32 S. Ct. at 3.  The Court upheld the application of 
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the regulation to the intrastate railcars, since such a close relationship existed between 
the intra- and inter- state traffic that congressional power could be "exerted to secure 
the safety of the persons and property transported" in interstate commerce, even though 
the "dangers intended to be avoided arise, in whole or in part, out of matters connected 
with intrastate commerce."  Id. at 27, 32 S. Ct. at 4.  
 Similarly, in the Shreveport Rate Cases, the Court upheld the ICC's ability to 
regulate the "relation" between inter- and intra- state rail rates by requiring an 
increase in the price of the intra-state rate.  In both these cases the Court was 
concerned with the regulation of "intrastate transactions of interstate carriers".  
Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 353, 34 S. Ct. at 837 (emphasis supplied).  Given this 
caselaw, the majority's conclusion that § 2119 constitutes a regulation of an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce because cars can be used as instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce dramatically extends congressional power under this category of 
authority.  
 The Supreme Court's discussion in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. at 150, 91 S. 
Ct. at 1359, is not to the contrary.  In Perez, the Court recognized that Congress could 
protect the "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as for example, the destruction of 
an aircraft (18 U.S.C. § 32)."  Id. at 150, 91 S. Ct. at 359.  At the time of Perez
provided a criminal penalty for "[w]hoever willfully sets fire to, damages . . . any civil 
aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce
While the majority correctly recognizes that motor vehicles are often used as 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce (e.g., commercial trucking, interstate bus 
services, travelling salespeople, and even perhaps commuters), § 2119, unlike 18 U.S.C. 




  If § 2119 were limited, like § 32, to the carjacking of automobiles "engaged 
in interstate commerce," this statute would indeed proscribe interference with an item 
being used as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, which Congress could properly 
regulate under this branch of Commerce Clause authority.  However, § 2119's scope is 
dramatically broader, given that it governs all automobiles (regardless of their 
connection to interstate commerce) including those, like the one involved in this case, 
which are clearly not being used as instrumentalities of interstate commerce.   
 It is enough for the majority that intrastate carjacking threatens both in
and out-of-state motorists. But to reiterate, this is not the proper focus under this 
prong of Commerce Clause analysis.  In regulating under this branch of authority, Congress 
can protect instrumentalities of interstate commerce.  The fact that a motorist from 
Cherry Hill, New Jersey, is subject to a risk of carjacking in Philadelphia, does not 
convert this motorist's automobile into an instrumentality of interstate commerce 
equivalent to a commercial train or airplane transporting passengers and goods both inter
and intra-state.0  The regulation of air and rail travel is simply not a valid 
analogy.  Such federal regulation is proper since both airplanes and trains are, nearly 
exclusively, used as instrumentalities of interstate commerce -- that is, air and rail 
travel involves, overwhelmingly, the sale of both inter- and intra-state transportation 
                     
0The majority recognizes this important distinction between the carjacking statute and 18 
U.S.C. § 32 in dismissing Stokes' reliance on United States v. Heightland, 865 F.2d 94 
(6th Cir. 1989).  See maj. op. at 49. 
0In Cortner, Judge Wiseman recognized that, 
 
[i]f anything that will take you across a state line is an 
"instrumentality of commerce," then there is justification for 
Congress to regulate anything done on a bicycle or, for that matter, 
on foot.  The Framers traveled to Philadelphia on horseback or by 
horse and carriage.  Can it be imagined that in constructing the 
Commerce Clause they intended to regulate and punish horse stealing? 
 
834 F. Supp. at 243. 
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services for persons and/or cargo.0 We do not deal here with the ability of Congress to 
regulate or protect intra- and inter-state bus or commercial truck travel. Such regulation 
is clearly proper, since it, in contrast to § 2119, would involve the regulation of actual 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.  Rather, we deal here with a regulation 
governing all automobiles in all instances. 
 In reaching its conclusion, the majority misreads the scope of existing Sup
Court precedent.  Foremost, its reliance on Alstate Const. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 73 
S. Ct. 565 (1953) and Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 63 S. Ct. 494 (1943), 
is simply misplaced.  These cases address the question whether, pursuant to a statute
regulating an entity "engaged in interstate commerce," the regulated entity in fact fell 
within this statutory requirement.  As the Court explained, Overstreet was  
another case in which we must define the scope of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.  The precise question is whether petitioners, who are 
engaged in maintaining or operating a toll road and a drawbridge over 
a navigable waterway which together constitute a medium for the 
interstate movement of goods and persons, are "engaged in commerce" 
within the meaning of §§ 6 and 7 of the Act, . . . [where] "commerce" 
[is defined as] "commerce . . . among the several States."   
 
318 U.S. at 126 & n.2, 63 S. Ct. at 495-96 & n.2 (footnote and citations omitted).  The 
Court concluded that they were. 
 Alstate was a similar case.  Alstate was a road contractor which also 
manufactured a road surfacing material. Most of its work was to install the material on 
railroads and interstate roads.  The Court observed that: 
                     
0To the extent that federal aviation regulation governs non-commercial aircraft, a 
distinction from the regulation of automobiles remains, given that the use of non-
commercial airplanes dramatically implicates the safety of interstate commercial air 
travel, which depends on the regulation of all planes using our nation's air space in a 
manner not present in the regulation of automobiles.  See Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota
322 U.S. 292, 303, 64 S. Ct. 950, 956 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Air as an element 
in which to navigate is even more inevitably federalized by the commerce clause than is 
navigable water. . . .  Congress has recognized the national responsibility for regulating 
air commerce.  Federal control is intensive and exclusive."). 
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he who serves interstate highways and railroads serves commerce.  By 
the same token he who produces goods for these indispensable and 
inseparable parts of commerce produces goods for commerce.  We 
therefore conclude that Alstate's off-the-road employees were covered 
by the Fair Labor Standards Act because engaged in "production of 
goods for commerce." 
 As the Supreme Court once again clarified in United States v. Robertson, 115 S. 
Ct. 1732, 1732-33 (1995) (per curiam), the question whether an entity is "engaged in 
interstate commerce" under an applicable statute is a question quite different from 
whether a statute, lacking any such requirement, otherwise falls within Congress's 
Commerce Clause authority.  See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197 n.12, 
95 S. Ct. 392, 399 n.12 (1974) ("The jurisdictional inquiry under [a statute], turning as 
it does on the circumstances presented in each case and requiring a particularized 
judicial determination, differs significantly from that required when Congress itself has 
defined the specific persons and activities that affect commerce and therefore require 
federal regulation." (emphasis added)).   
 The Court in Overstreet did bolster its conclusion that the bridge operator was 
engaged in interstate commerce by the fact that it operated a bridge which "constitute[d] 
a medium for the interstate movement of goods and persons."  Overstreet, 318 U.S. at 127, 
63 S. Ct. at 496.  However, the application of the statute to the entities in both 
Overstreet and Alstate rested first and foremost on the Court's statutory conclusion that 
the business was "engaged in interstate commerce."  Id., Alstate, 345 U.S. at 15-16, 735 
S. Ct. at 567.   
 In sum, the majority and the Oliver court reason that because cars are sometimes 
used as instrumentalities of interstate commerce, Congress can regulate any aspect of 
automobiles (and automobile traffic) under this branch of congressional authority.  
Federal power under the Commerce Clause, in my view, is not this broad.  The fact that 
automobiles can be used as instrumentalities of interstate commerce does not grant to 
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Congress plenary authority to regulate the use and operation of every individual's 
automobile.  Such an approach would constitute a dramatic encroachment on the regulation 
of automobiles, a traditional area of state concern, and would permit Congress to pass 
federal laws requiring individuals to wear seatbelts (as opposed to requiring that cars be 
manufactured with seatbelts) or banning motorists from making a right turn at a red 
light.0  Previous Commerce Clause jurisprudence has never before viewed congressional 
power to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce this broadly.  With its 
decision, the majority dramatically and improperly enhances the scope of federal power 
under this branch of Congress's Commerce Clause authority.   
3.  SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE  
 The majority's principal justification in upholding the constitutionality of 
§ 2119 is that Congress could have rationally concluded that carjacking has a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.  In its discussion, the majority does an excellent job of 
recounting the congressional findings with regard to the entire Anti-Car-Theft Act.  
maj. op. at 21-23. However, by recounting this legislative history, the majority conflates 
the relevant issues.  We do not deal here with the constitutionality of this entire Act or 
with the effect of car-theft rings, in the whole, on the economy.  Rather, our concern is 
with whether Congress could have rationally concluded that carjacking substantially 
affects interstate commerce through its role in interstate car-theft operations.   
                     
0I note in this regard that existing federal automobile regulation of this genre (i.e., 
the federal speed limit) has been exerted under the Spending Clause, not the Commerce 
Clause.  See 23 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. 1995) (conditioning receipt of federal highway funds 
on a state's enforcement of federally-imposed speed limits).  It has long been recognized 
that "`the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes 
is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.'"  
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2796 (1987) (quoting United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936)).  
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 Section 2119's legislative history is devoid of any findings in this regard, 
which should come as no surprise, since in enacting this provision Congress was concerned 
not with the economic effects of carjacking or with the relationship between carjacking 
and interstate car-theft operations, but rather with curtailing this well-publicized crime 
of violence.  This intent is abundantly clear from the legislative history cited by the 
majority: "In addition to economic costs, car owners are increasingly subject to violent 
crime.  The most recent developments in car-theft is `armed carjacking.'"  H.R. REP.
102-851, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 15 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829, 
2831 (emphasis added); id., pt. 3, at 2, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2895 ("Perhaps relating to 
the opportunity for profit, criminals are increasingly committing violent crime in the 
form of `armed carjacking.'"); see also 138 CONG. REC. H11,819 (1992) (statement of Rep. 
Ramstad) ("People are outraged and terrified by the heinous carjacking epidemic currently 
upon us.  How can any civilized nation tolerate the brutal killing of a mother dragged 2 
miles to her death . . . ?  How can any civilized people tolerate such despicable, 
outrageous criminal acts?  They cannot and they will not."); id. at H11,820 (statement of 
Rep. Collins) ("The most shocking case, involv[ing] a young mother who was dragged two 
miles to her death . . . has absolutely galvanized public opinion and outcry that this 
Congress act now to address this awesome despicable crime.").   
 Given this legislative history, it is clear that § 2119 was enacted to deal
carjacking as a crime of violence, not, as the majority now contends, to confront the 
effects of carjacking on the interstate economy.  Congress has not made any findings to 
support the conclusion that carjacking has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  
Congress made no such findings since, as the majority surmises, maj. op. at 42, Congress 
viewed § 2119's jurisdictional requirement, discussed supra at 7-16, as constitutionally 
sufficient.  I recognize that "Congress need [not] make particularized findings in order 
to legislate."  Perez, 402 U.S. at 156, 91 S. Ct. at 1362 (cited in Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 
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1631 ("Congress is normally not required to make formal findings as to the substantial 
burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.")).  Accordingly, I point to the lack 
of congressional findings only to demonstrate, that like the statute in Lopez, no such 
findings are available to support the government's contention that the intrastate activity 
has a substantial effect on commerce.  See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-32 ("[T]o the extent 
that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the 
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such 
substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.").  
 Given the lack of congressional findings, the majority constructs for Congress 
an argument that carjacking has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  The 
majority's argument is essentially two-fold; it contends: (1) that carjacking, itself, is 
a commercial transaction which, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate 
commerce; or (2) that Congress could have rationally concluded that § 2119 was a necessary 
element in thwarting the operation of car-theft rings, which Congress found to 
substantially affect interstate commerce. 
 In the first instance, the majority submits that carjacking can be upheld as a 
regulation of an intrastate commercial transaction which, through repetition, has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.  Maj. op. at 26-27 & n.20 (citing Hodel v. 
Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 325 (1981)).  In so doing, the majority runs afoul of Lopez.
 Importantly, the Court in Lopez concluded that the regulation of non-economic
intrastate activity could not be upheld under its cases dealing with the "regulations of 
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed 
in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.  
In limiting the application of its "substantial effects" jurisprudence to intrastate 
economic or commercial activity, the Court recognized that its prior caselaw in this area 
satisfied this limitation: 
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we have upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating 
intrastate economic activity where we have concluded that the activity 
substantially affected interstate commerce.  Examples include the 
regulation of intrastate coal mining; Hodel, supra, intrastate 
extortionate credit transactions, Perez, supra, restaurants utilizing 
substantial interstate supplies, McClung, supra, inns and hotels 
catering to interstate guests, Heart of Atlanta Motel, supra, and 
production and consumption of home-grown wheat, Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942). These examples are 
by no means exhaustive, but the pattern is clear.  Where economic 
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained. 
 
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.   
 In articulating this important limitation on its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 
the Lopez court "admitted[] [that] a determination whether an intrastate activity is 
commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty." Id. at 1633.  
But the Court recognized that "so long as Congress' authority is limited to those powers 
enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as 
having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under the Commerce 
Clause always will engender `legal uncertainty.'"  Id.  Following Lopez, the Court in 
United States v. Robertson reiterated this new important limitation on its substantial 
effects jurisprudence: "The `affecting commerce' test was developed in our jurisprudence 
to define the extent of Congress's power over purely intrastate commercial activities that 
nonetheless have substantial interstate effects."  115 S. Ct. at 1733 (emphasis added). 
 The majority concludes that the Court's limitation of its substantial effects 
jurisprudence to intrastate commercial or economic activity does not preclude application 
of the doctrine to § 2119 since, in the majority's view, carjacking is a commercial 
transaction.  In reaching this conclusion, the majority's analysis evidences none of 
"legal uncertainty" that concerned the Court in Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633, since it is 
sufficient for the majority that "[w]hen a criminal points a gun at a victim and takes his 
or her car, the criminal has made an economic gain and the victim has suffered an 
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undeniable substantial loss."  Maj. op. at 27.  The majority then attempts to measure the 
"economic effect" of carjacking by concluding that it is equivalent to the sum of the 
value of all carjacked automobiles.  See maj. op. at 32 n. 20.  In my view, the majority's 
definition of commercial transaction is too broad and thereby runs afoul of the Lopez
Court's requirement that the definition of "commercial" provide "real limits" on the scope 
of Commerce Clause authority.  115 S. Ct. at 1633 (rejecting the primary dissent's 
contention that "Congress could rationally conclude that schools fall on the commercial 
side of the line," on the grounds that such a "rationale lacks any real limits because, 
depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial").  
 The majority sweeps within its definition of commercial activity all criminal 
acts which involve a coercive (non-consensual) transfer of economic benefit from victim to 
perpetrator.  A definition of this breadth would not only include carjacking, but also 
would clearly include all crimes of theft. Indeed, if Chief Judge Posner is correct, 
perhaps it includes all criminal activity.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
18 (4th ed. 1992) (contending that "[m]urder, robbery, burglary, larceny, rape, assault 
and battery, mayhem, false pretenses, and most other common law crimes (i.e., crimes 
punishable under the English common law)" all "represent a pure coercive transfer either 
of wealth or utility from victim to wrongdoer").  While I concede that it is far from 
clear what the Court meant in Lopez by a "commercial transaction," I submit that the 
preferable definition of commercial transaction requires an activity involving a voluntary
economic exchange.0  To define a commercial transaction as broadly as the majority does 
any activity involving a transfer of wealth from victim to wrongdoer -- is to embrace a 
                     
0The Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942), "perhaps 
the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity," 
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630, is not to the contrary.  Wickard dealt with the production and 
consumption of home grown wheat, an activity that undeniably bears a connection with a 
voluntary economic exchange -- the need vel non of the regulated entity (the farmer) to 
purchase wheat in the market place.  See Wickard, 63 S. Ct. at 84, 90-91. 
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence that includes within its scope a broad array of criminal 
activity, which "[u]nder our federal system, the States possess primary authority for 
defining and enforcing . . . ."  Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 The majority's second "substantial effects" argument is somewhat distinct from 
its first.  It contends that Congress could have rationally concluded that carjacking was 
"an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory 
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."  Id. at 1631.  In 
the majority's view, Congress could have concluded that criminalizing carjacking was an 
essential part of the regulation of car-theft rings, which are interstate commercial 
enterprises that Congress found to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
 Given the lack of congressional findings on the nexus between carjacking and 
car-theft rings, the majority constructs its argument from anecdotal evidence drawn from 
newspaper reports suggesting that some carjackers have sold automobiles into car-theft 
rings.  In addition, the majority relies on police reports and some statements by 
congressmen that suggest that modern anti-theft devices have made it easier to carjack 
many vehicles than to steal them when they are parked.  The majority also relies on a 
Department of Justice Report on carjacking.  See An Analysis of Carjacking in the United 
States (Oct. 14, 1992).  Such reliance is misplaced, given that the thrust of this report 
directly undercuts the majority's contention that carjacking forms a part of the operation 
of car theft rings.   
 After discussing car theft rings (i.e., chop shops, salvage switching of vehicle 
identification numbers, exportation, and insurance fraud), the report states: 
 In each of the above instances, there was relatively little 
danger to the American public as the sole motive was to obtain the 
vehicle for its value.  In contrast, the new carjacking problem is 
more akin to the violent street crimes associated with street gangs 
and the drug subculture. . . . 
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 The primary motives appear to be transportation for a getaway 
after robbing the driver, a source of transportation to commit another 
crime, joyriding, and to a lesser degree, to derive a profit from the 
resale of the vehicle or its parts.   
 
 
Department of Justice, An Analysis of Carjacking in the United States (Oct. 14, 1992) at 
2-3 (emphasis supplied) ("The San Juan Division notes that only eight percent of the 
vehicles carjacked in their division are recovered suggesting that they are either 
chopped, replated, or exported.")   
 From these several sources, the majority reasons that carjacking is becoming a 
more effective way for car-theft rings to steal cars.  Maj. op. at 29.  While the majority 
has done a fine job in constructing this argument in its attempt to preserve the 
constitutionality of § 2119, I cannot agree that Congress could have rationally concluded 
that carjacking constitutes conduct that contributes significantly to the operation of 
car-theft operations.  This is especially so in view of the fact that the number of 
reported carjackings at the time of the enactment of the Anti-Car-theft Act of 1992 
constituted less than 2% of the number of autos stolen in this country on an annual 
basis.0  
 The majority draws the legal support for its argument from the Court's opin
in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971), where, as the majority 
recognizes, the Court upheld a criminal loan sharking provision because Congress concluded 
that intrastate loan sharking constituted a significant aspect of the operation of 
organized crime, which had an adverse effect on interstate commerce.  While the legal 
framework of the majority's argument is similar to Perez, this case is clearly 
                     
0See Department of Justice, An Analysis of Carjacking in the United States (Oct. 14, 1992) 
at 33; Nancy Gibbs, Hell on wheels; Car Crime is no longer a matter of stealing parts but 
of taking lives -- and an American icon becomes less and less of a sanctuary, TIME 44 
(August 16, 1993) ("The FBI estimates that there were 25,000 carjackings last year . . . 
[which] is still only a tiny fraction of the 1.6 million annual car thefts."). 
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distinguishable, since in Perez the Court relied on extensive congressional findings that 
"grew out of a `profound study of organized crime, its ramifications and its implications' 
undertaken by some 22 Congressmen," id. at 155, 91 S. Ct. at 1362 (quoting 114 CONG.
at 14391).  These findings in turn relied on an executive branch report stating "that loan 
sharking was `the second largest source of revenue for organized crime,' and is one way by 
which the underworld obtains control of legitimate businesses."  Id. (quoting THE CHALLENGE 
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE 190 (February 1967)).  
 The Perez Court recognized that these findings "supplied Congress with the 
knowledge that the loan shark racket provides organized crime with its second most 
lucrative course of revenue, exacts millions from the pockets of people, coerces its 
victims into the commission of crimes against property, and causes the takeover by 
racketeers of legitimate businesses."  402 U.S. at 156, 91 S. Ct. at 1362 (emphasis 
added).  Given these findings, the majority cannot assert that the role of carjacking in 
the operation of inter-state car-theft rings approaches anywhere near the essential role 
of loan sharking in the operation of organized crime.  Indeed, in constructing its 
argument the majority can point to little more than random newspaper clippings to suggest 
that carjacking has any relationship to interstate car-theft rings, let alone a 
relationship comparable to that of loan sharking to organized crime.  Accordingly, I 
cannot agree that the majority's analysis establishes a relationship between carjacking 
and car-theft rings of a degree that satisfies existing constitutional requirements. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 In sum, I believe that non-commercial intrastate crimes, even ones receiv
publicity in the national media, are a matter of state and not federal concern.  Pre
courts were correct to conclude that although § 2119 "may stretch the outer limits of the 
Commerce Clause, under current doctrine it is not unconstitutional."  United States v. 
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Overstreet, 40 F.3d 1090, 1093 (10th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).  However, after Lopez
believe that the outer boundary has shifted, since, as I have demonstrated, Lopez is not 
just another Supreme Court case, but a watershed.  For all of the foregoing reasons, I 
respectfully dissent. 
   
